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ABSTRACT
CULTIVATING THE HUMAN NARRATIVE: ON NIETZSCHE, SCIENCE FICTION,
AND THE AESTHETICS OF LIFE
Derek Carpenter
August 4, 2022
In this dissertation, I will argue that there is a specific model of morality which can
account for the intuition about moral features that we take to be intrinsic to the human
type. This model of morality is that of Virtue Ethics, but not a conventional kind of
Virtue Ethics. Instead, I will argue that the moral philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
presents a model of cultivating narrative types that we take to be grounded in the kinds of
beings we are, without resorting to any problematic metaphysical systems. This will
require that I defend a novel interpretation of Nietzsche’s ethics – a debate which is
ongoing. In the first chapter of the dissertation, I will argue that Nietzsche’s valuations
can be reconciled with his attacks on conventional ethical systems, and that his value
claims can best be understood with reference to his aesthetic views. In the second
chapter, I will explore the specific details of Nietzsche’s broad attacks on ethical systems,
and then defend his subsequent value claims as analogous to a unique kind of virtue
theory. In articulating how this kind of virtue theory functions, I will also propose that
this is how we arrive at our moral conception of the human narrative. In the final chapter
of this dissertation, I will draw from specific examples of science fiction narratives to
v

elaborate two specific views of the genre-specific trope of the “artificial human being.” In
exploration of this trope, I find that our intuitions of the moral human are affirmed in our
narrative fascination with ontological types, and also that there are under-explored
implications of how these narratives are developed.
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INTRODUCTION

In the early part of the last decade, a series of short videos were released by the Boston
Dynamics Laboratory, documenting advances in robotics technology. In these videos,
engineers introduced various quadrupedal and bipedal robots, and then subjected them to
what resembles repeated “abuse” – knocking them down and physically impeding their
paths, or introducing other various ways to confuse and interfere with the completion of
their assigned tasks. The intent of these videos was to demonstrate the resiliency of the
machines in recovering from physical upsets, as well as their powers of computative
reasoning in response to unforeseen resistances. Aside from the anticipated wonder at
how machines could now operate at such sophisticated levels of autonomy in problemsolving, another reaction to these videos was surprisingly common – sympathy. Many
viewers would react with pity toward machines which it is reasonable to assume could
experience no suffering as a result of this perceived mistreatment. If these machines are
not beings capable of suffering, then why do these videos so commonly provoke this kind
of reaction?
In a 2020 study, Christoph Bartneck and Merel Keijsers explored a similar
scenario. Test subjects were shown videos depicting different kinds of violence inflicted
upon robots, and then a second set of videos depicting the same kinds of violence
inflicted upon humans. Interestingly, when comparing the two sets of videos, test subjects
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generally believed both scenarios to be equivalently wrong, whether the victim was
human or machine. 1 Perhaps reactions such as these have something to do with the
similarity of robotic machines to beings that actually do possess the capacities for reason
and autonomy – beings that may actually suffer pain and frustration. However, there is
little in the way of anthropomorphic resemblance in the Boston Dynamics robots that
should provoke such a response. In many cases, their form is vaguely recognizable as a
chassis of limbs and torso, but that is as close as it gets. Nothing implies that they
experience anything like frustration, pain, or confusion. Still, the behavior that we do see,
the struggling through purposive obstruction and hindrance, seeing their bodies upended,
struck, and shoved down, may affect us, if even briefly, as something fundamentally
human-like in expression – the perceived similarity of this activity to human struggling
and suffering.
Consider another example. In a video created by researchers Fritz Heier and
Marianne Simmel, several animated geometric shapes are shown interacting. 2 A larger
triangle “follows” two smaller shapes – another triangle and a circle – around the screen.
The shapes occasionally collide and appear to react to one another in various ways. At
one point, one of the shapes appears to “hide” from the large triangle. The experiment
reveals that when subjects are asked to describe what they see in the video, they usually
construct a narrative which anthropomorphizes the shapes in some way. 3 The larger
shape is often interpreted to be the aggressor, terrorizing the smaller shapes, who panic
See Bartneck and Keijsers (2020). It must be noted that when these subjects were instead shown videos
of the “victims” retaliating against attack, they were more willing to view the humans as justified in
fighting back against robot attackers than the other way around.
2
Goldman (2013). Accessed at: https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/thoughtful-animal/animatinganthropomorphism-giving-minds-to-geometric-shapes-video/
3
Heier, Simmel (1944)
1
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and flee, eventually escaping from the large shape. The Heier/Simmel experiment
suggests that to anthropomorphize the behavior of objects, and even to construct
narratives which explain this behavior, is a conceptual framework by which we make
sense of phenomena. This probably tells us more about our preconceptions of
anthropomorphic behavior than about the phenomena itself, and specifically, what we
take to constitute right and wrong behavior of beings toward other beings. However, if
we are affected in this way by such minimal degrees of resemblance to human activity,
then we can easily see how we could be further affected if the degrees of similarity were
much closer, as in instances of more elaborate and intentional mimicry of human action,
such as those depicted in the narratives of science fiction.
When we examine these kinds of situations in narrative constructions – the robot
or cyborg, the artificial human beings of science fiction – we find that in addition to the
sense of futuristic wonder that they lend to such stories, they embody kinds of details that
we value about our status as human beings, and facts about how we actually define that
state through these values. We derive a sense of how our fundamental idea of humanity is
differentiated from the hypothetical not-human, and the effects of this variability of
difference. In this differentiation, we see how we perform the concept of the human, and
in this performance, the features of the category of humanity which are crucial to our
narrative of self are also revealed.
One of the most significant dimensions of difference between humans and the
human-like machines of science fiction is how we understand human beings in relation to
categories of morality. If a human-like machine is so different from us that it does not
share any of the most fundamental capacities we associate with agency and moral
3

reasoning, then we may draw two conclusions: we do not hold this machine to any moral
responsibility, and we do not owe any moral responsibility toward it. The reason that this
claim seems strange is that it is so intuitive. There are no machines that we hold to a
standard of moral responsibility, nor are there any that we are morally obligated toward,
except for those obligations related to property rights, various terms of legal usage, and
the like, but these exceptions are actually only kinds of obligations toward other human
beings. Though I believe it is possible that this claim may age poorly, at the time I am
writing this, no machine is currently entitled to what we could rightly refer to as human
rights.
There is a moral sense of the human – an idea of how beings should act, based on
the kind of beings that they are. Human beings hold a standard of moral responsibility
that mere machines do not. If we do not hold non-human beings to a moral standard
because they are incapable of moral reasoning, then our sense of morality is contingent to
a state of being that we currently understand as uniquely human. We may get angry at
machines, but we always understand that a machine is a kind of thing that cannot operate
at a moral capacity. Similarly, we may expect animals to understand different levels of
preferred behaviors, and we may even employ morally-loaded terminology that reflects
this when they fail to instantiate the preferred behaviors, such as “bad dog,” or “illtempered cat,” but we do not actually hold animals to be moral agents, nor do we label
them as transgressors or exemplars. To be human is then to inhabit a unique state in
which morality is a fundamental reality for us.
But what about a hypothetical scenario (a thought experiment) that introduces
machines that are almost human; would these beings warrant a greater degree of moral
4

responsibility than mere machines? Are there varying degrees of a concept such as
human moral responsibility? How do we feel about immoral action toward a being that is
obviously not human, but that we know is capable of experiencing the negative effects of
mistreatment in the same way that we do (unlike, presumably, the Boston Dynamics
robots)? How would we feel toward the fully human beings that would inflict this
mistreatment, in full awareness of the effects on these hypothetical humanlike machines?
The differences I have discussed reveal consequences of our designation of a
moral type of humanity. We think of human beings as occupying a unique state in which
we can engage in questions about moral responsibility, and so there is something in the
narrative of the human type that automatically entails some kind of moral dimension. Do
we also believe the right kind of moral behavior rather than the wrong to be associated
with humanity in the authentic sense? It is common for us to consider humanity in
correspondence with specific moral features, such as an automatic inclination toward
good moral behavior. For instance, we consider cruelty to be an expression of the
inhumane dispositions of certain types of individuals. When we appeal to the goodness of
individuals, we often say that we make an appeal to their humanity.
In the chapters that follow, I will argue that there is a specific model of morality
which can account for our intuitions about moral features that we take to be intrinsic to
the human type. We have a general sense of what constitutes good action, and what kinds
of moral outlooks we take to be a properly human level of exemplary moral conduct, but
we have problems in grounding these views in conventional moral systems. The reason
for these problems is that our moral systems often push us into accepting contradictory
directives or committing ourselves to unsound moral ideals. I will argue that the viable
5

alternative to flawed or inconsistent foundational systems lies in the moral philosophy of
Friedrich Nietzsche.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I will discuss Nietzsche’s strategies of
valuation, and argue that in his attacks on problematic moral systems, he offers us an
alternative morality, reflected in the kinds of exemplar narratives that he develops over
the span of his writings. Importantly, Nietzsche’s moral views are best understood with
reference to his aesthetic views. In other words, the kinds of behaviors that we should
normalize are those which embody beautiful ways of living, on Nietzsche’s terms.
Identifying which specific behaviors and characteristics Nietzsche endorses can be
difficult given the discursive, and even at times contradictory ways that he articulates his
visions of exemplar types. However, Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, unlike the
conventional systems which he attacks, does not outline specific answers to the complete
spectrum of moral challenges, but instead guides us to the point that we are able to supply
our own answers to these challenges, free from influences which would constrain us to
patterns of action which are stagnant, mediocre, or even grotesque. Generally, this means
ways of living that demonstrate creativity, authentic commitment to self-expression, and
some level of ability to recognize the value in unconventional perspectives.
In the second chapter, I will explore the specific implications of Nietzsche’s broad
attacks on ethical systems, and then defend his subsequent value claims as a more stable
form of virtue theory. In articulating how a Nietzschean conception of virtue functions, I
will also propose that this is how we arrive at our moral conception of the human
narrative. Whereas conventional moral systems prescribe actions based upon
presumptions of autonomy, intention, and the ability to anticipate the similarity of
6

outcomes with any kind of prescriptive relevance, Nietzsche observes that we do not have
reliable access to these criteria. 4 Instead, Nietzsche presses us to cultivate habits that will
help to free us from these systems, including those dispositions toward independent
thinking, and the ability to recognize different forms of the human narrative as valuable
on these terms. When we conceive of those moral characteristics that we take to be
essentially human, we have been conditioned to accept a specific set of virtues as the
right type of human. By contrast, a Nietzschean virtue set would entail the cultivation of
habits by which we create our own virtues, and our own narrative conception of the
human exemplar. This Nietzschean conception of the human virtue set is no less a
narrative construction than the conventional model, but it represents a more sustainable
narrative, an aesthetic ideal.
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will draw from specific examples of
science fiction narratives to elaborate two specific views of the genre-specific trope of the
“artificial human being” in order to establish the argument of a moral model of humanity
outlined in the previous chapters. In exploration of this genre trope, I find that our
intuitions of the moral human are affirmed in our narrative fascination with ontological
types, and also that there are under-explored implications of how these narratives are
developed. In one version of the human narrative, the non-human are cast as flawed, or
even monstrous by comparison to their authentically human counterparts. In the second
version of the narrative, conventional distinctions between human and non-human are
challenged as arbitrary, revealing that what we value in the exemplar types is not
essentialized in the form of biological human beings, but in a range of moral behavior

4

BGE §32
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that we quantify as uniquely human, opening the door for a range of human types that
may not be, strictly speaking, human. While the first narrative type presents the
excessively optimistic view that good exists in us simply by virtue of the type of beings
that we are, the second narrative type acknowledges that those characteristics we take to
be uniquely human are actually the result of an ongoing process of self-cultivation – of
refining the human narrative. In showing us a “robot’s progress” from machine to
authentic humanity, many science fiction narratives provide a metaphorical view of our
own existential condition, of constantly becoming, and overcoming the narrative of self.
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CHAPTER 1
ON THE AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS OF NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS

1.1 Introduction to Nietzschean Ethics
The most prevalent theme in Nietzsche’s writings is the general upending of knowledge
structures which ground conventional systems and values. Because of this, it is easy to
conclude that there is no room in his philosophy for discourse frequently affiliated with
normative thinking and theory. Some critics argue that to interpret Nietzsche as a moral
theorist risks misrepresenting his overall intent, which is to free us from ethical
structures, rather than substitute new ones in their place. 5 Further complicating the notion
of a coherent moral strategy is Nietzsche’s rejection of conventional models of agency,
rendering the designation of moral responsibility problematic or impossible. It is
challenging to conceptualize how Nietzschean normative claims or theories might be
grounded without contradicting these criticisms, though one observation remains clear:
alongside Nietzsche’s attacks on stagnant, outmoded, and ill-founded value systems he
presents their antitheses — both elaborately articulated judgments and implicit appraisals
of what kinds of actions and beliefs constitute a life of worth and merit. In other words,
Nietzsche’s critique of conventional ethics creates an alternative to those systems.

5

Berry (2015), Foot (2002).
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As with conventional ethical systems, in Nietzsche’s writings, claims about
actualizing a particular kind of life become prescriptive strategies. Throughout the
discussion that follows, this project will demonstrate that Nietzsche articulates a unified
ethical vision, and that uniquely situated as a consequence of his critiques, it is resilient to
the threat of self-contradiction under the rigor of his own wide-ranging skepticism. The
best way to demonstrate that there is such an ethical strategy in Nietzsche’s work is
through an examination of the intersection between his ethical, metaphysical, and
aesthetic views. Such an approach will offer insights into how we as human beings
formulate contingent sets of values, specifically those embodied in a narrative
construction of human agency.
1.2 Nietzsche’s Ethical Skepticism: Truth, Part One
One response to apparent incongruities in Nietzsche’s work is to reject the
interpretation of possible moral commitments in preservation of his more obvious
deconstructive arguments; in other words, Nietzsche is not seriously engaged in the
development and defense of ethical claims and is only concerned with discrediting the
suppositions on which such claims may be grounded. If we interpret Nietzsche this way,
we may argue that what is commonly ascribed to be ethical claims in his work are
generally misinterpreted as such or are merely metaphorical and nothing more. 6
However, this strategy is unconvincing. Nietzsche’s outwardly discursive commentaries
on culture and society consistently imply a state of affairs in contrast to that which is

In other words, to hold such a view would be to reject the views of those who interpret Nietzsche as a
positive “moralist,” including Robert Solomon (1985), Christine Swanton (1998), and Christine Daigle
(2015).
6
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reflected in standing cultural norms. Nietzsche constructs elaborate thought experiments
of what human life could, and in many cases should resemble. Ideal modes of living are
revealed to us in distinct narratives and aphoristic characterizations of a kind of human
agent that has achieved mastery over a preferred range of existential possibility. Any such
narrative presumes a background state of values; Nietzsche clearly elevates one way of
living over another. In this way, specific values that are embodied in the exemplar agents
of Nietzsche’s accounts become prescriptive.
Where do we situate Nietzsche’s presumed value claims in relation to his attacks
on the foundations of ethics? It would be puzzling to suggest that Nietzsche (or any
committed skeptic) would so comprehensively attack the weak metaphysical grounding
of value norms and then proceed to build new normative arguments using the same kinds
of grounding. Generally, Nietzsche does not reject the possibility of morality, but the
standing systems by which we normalize moral practices. 7 Reconciling Nietzsche’s
axiology with his general criticisms is possible. It is simply the case that one must
proceed with a clear distinction between what Nietzsche is specifically attacking and that
which he is defending or advocating. To understand how Nietzsche promotes specific
sets of moral values alongside his widespread rejection of value systems, we must
understand that the targets of Nietzsche’s critiques embody morality in a way that
Nietzsche finds both harmful and ill-conceived. The critical lens through which we
identify how we value these values, and by which we subject our values to deeper
scrutiny becomes a foundation for Nietzsche’s moral stance. By subjecting the intuitive
foundations of forms of morality to such scrutiny, many of them are revealed to promote

7

See BGE §7, “Our Virtues”
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norms which are in conflict with one another, or which otherwise fail to produce
beneficial outcomes.
Brian Leiter categorizes Nietzsche’s collective references to these unsound,
disadvantageous, and contradictory types of morality as “morality in the pejorative
sense,” or “MPS”. 2 In Nietzsche’s writings, MPS is often held to possess any of the
following irredeemable flaws: a problematic assumption of agency and action which
grounds the evaluation of acts as either “good” or “bad,” an unsupportable identification
of similarity in all occurrences of kinds of actions evaluated under MPS, or a general
restriction of exceptional human beings to a level of mediocrity. 8 The justifications for
Nietzsche’s rejection of these specific presumptions are thorough and I will explore each
of them further in the next section. For the present discussion, the most relevant failing of
MPS is that it erroneously presumes a world which is fundamentally accessible to the
faculties of human reason, and compatible with the aims of human flourishing. 9
In the most general sense, though they presuppose a great deal, ethical systems
that fall under the umbrella of MPS entail sets of statements which, on the surface at
least, are not controversial. These statements are supported by prescriptive arguments
about how human beings should act under various circumstances. Claims such as “one
should do this” or “these outcomes are ultimately preferable to others” conventionally
rely upon knowledge of the nature of human agents and their relationship to the world in

Leiter (2015). From here forward, following Leiter’s terminology, I will continue to employ the
abbreviation “MPS” when broadly referring to ethical systems that Nietzsche implicitly or explicitly
rejects.
8
For Nietzsche’s critique of agency, see BGE §32 and GM §I.12; for Nietzsche’s critique of the identity of
similar actions, see GS §335 and BGE §215; for Nietzsche’s critique of values which make us mediocre, see
BGE §228 and GS §21.
9
BT §3; HH §517
2
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which they exist. Both deontological and consequentialist ethics ultimately draw ethical
conclusions based on a recognition of what we take to be patterns of causation. In the
case of Kant’s deontological ethics, some will to act causes a subsequent action. In the
case of consequentialist systems of ethics such as those of Bentham and Mill, this basic
acceptance that we can recognize patterns of cause and effect entails a belief that we can
anticipate that certain actions will cause reasonably predictable outcomes. An ethical
argument of this kind is therefore a metaphysical one — meaning that if we can
understand at a fundamental level what kinds of beings we are, what kind of world we
inhabit, and how this world works, then we should be able to logically infer the kinds of
circumstances that are most favorable for us, by an accepted measure of value, and then
be able to prescribe actions that follow from this reasoning. Nietzsche raises a variety of
challenges to all of the above presumptions, not the least of which is the question of
whether the accepted metaphysical foundations of moral reasoning are actually available
to us at all.
At the beginning of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche acknowledges a
philosophical intuition which is difficult to escape: the view that there is a part of the
world separate from that which we directly perceive, and that owing to limitations of
perception and reason, this “hidden” level of reality remains necessarily inaccessible. 10
This intuition is reflected in the skepticism of many classical traditions, but also
motivates the dualities explored in modern systems such as those of Kant and Descartes.
The problem skeptics confront is that we only have access to appearances, and things

10

BT §1, §15
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appear inconsistently to us at least some of the time. 3 Skeptics warn that we may become
reliant upon a kind of dogmatic belief that the world will conform to expectations we
form based upon patterns of appearances. This problem is compounded when an
argument is justified in principles which rely upon something more fundamental and
enduring than appearances – i.e., the underlying nature or “essence” – that elusive layer
of reality we intuit to exist somewhere outside of the reach of our senses. In trusting our
faculties, we can never eliminate the risk that either our perceptions or the reasoning
which follows from them may be inaccurate.
The difficulty of truth correspondence in the wake of skepticism is significant for
Nietzsche’s critiques of ethics. Because we have no reliable access to the presumed
foundations of knowledge, metaphysical or otherwise, we have no means of verifying
that our argumentative claims bear any relationship to the foundational truth that they
intend. Do universal systems such as ethics actually presume to be grounded in complete
and accurate knowledge (an impossibility), and in formulating these systems do we
fabricate truth, filling in the gaps where our knowledge runs out? Do we fill in these gaps
in our knowledge of the world in a way that serves underlying agenda or intentions,
rather than the interest of truth itself? Or more importantly, do we impose an
interpretation which disguises some of these agenda?
To accept the belief in a fundamental level of truth which is distinct from, and
may not actually resemble, our current experiences of the world is to accept that on some
level all of the so-called foundational principles on which our knowledge (ethical or

3

See Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism §1; Zhuangzi §1.
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otherwise) is grounded could be wrong, or worse, knowledge at this “foundational” level
could be impossible. However, to formulate principles intending them as universal
necessities presumes that these principles are valid under the full range of possible
particular conditions. Even accepting that our present range of knowledge does not
encompass all available facts of these conditions, faith in the metaphysical grounding of
principles entails the notion that eventually, theoretically, it could do so. The more that
we believe that we learn of the world, the more we are tempted by this possibility.11 At
any rate, we cannot bypass the skeptical concern that this kind of inquiry is doomed –
that it would eventually presume the accessibility of knowledge that is forever and
necessarily beyond our reach. 12
Even more problematically, further inquiry into the nature of the world only
increases awareness of the epistemic limits of the conditions within which we exist. The
more we try to resolve our ignorance, the more ignorant we realize ourselves to be, and
the more incapable of expelling this ignorance. If we are unable to discharge this
skepticism about the limits of our knowledge, then it complicates the effort to justify
ethical arguments in any kind of objective metaphysical necessity. At the very least, any
inquiry directed at the honest and rigorous pursuit of foundational knowledge ultimately
only pushes us toward the inescapable awareness of its own limitations. As Nietzsche
observes in The Birth of Tragedy, “[...]science, spurred on by its powerful delusion [of

In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche states: “Anyone who has experienced the intense pleasure of Socratic
insight, and felt it spread out in ever-widening circles as it attempted to encompass the entire world of
appearances, will forever feel that there can be no sharper goad to life than the desire to complete the
conquest and weave the net impenetrably close”(§15).
12
GS §335
11
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the accessibility of knowledge], is hurrying unstoppably to its limits, where the optimism
hidden in the essence of logic will founder and break up.” 13
If we accept the proposition that the divide between appearance and reality will
never be closed through the process of our inquiry, then this also entails the tacit
acceptance of a duality: there is the world of human experience, and the world behind it
that we either do not or cannot experience. This means that the mundane realm of human
experience, flawed as it is, characterizes a type of existence which we hold to be
fundamentally illusory, in contrast with the realm of truth — objective and undebatable,
necessary but unattainable. The distinction between truth and illusion, and the longstanding skeptic discussions of the discernible relationships between this duality serve as
background to Nietzsche’s metaphysical discussions in The Birth of Tragedy.
If we take the basis of knowledge to originate at a level of reality below
appearances – i.e., the so-called “world-in-itself,” which is necessarily outside of our
realm of experience – then on what basis could we successfully evaluate human conduct
or establish moral directives? The problem is actually more complex than it may seem, as
the conventional foundationalist model presumes a knowledge of self which is likewise
elusive. Once again, in ordinary ethical discourse we operate under the customary
assumption of what kinds of beings we are and under what sort of circumstances we live
in order to enact principles grounded in what is good or bad for us. But Nietzsche
challenges this view, observing, “[…]there is no such substratum; there is no “being”
behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed – the

13

BT §15
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deed is everything.” 14 To further emphasize this, Nietzsche proclaims that
counterintuitively, “Everyone is farthest from himself.” 15 In this and other similar
passages, Nietzsche appears to adopt a view that a human being is not identical to a
ground of consciousness from which agency emerges and action then follows; a human
being is instead a particular kind of convergence of underlying yet indeterminate
phenomena which express themselves through actions. 16 As Aaron Ridley argues, for
Nietzsche, the intention to act and the action itself are not discrete phenomena, but are
merely parts of a single “mutually constitutive” event. 17 In effect, Nietzsche collapses
agency and action into a single phenomenon, and this is what is actually accessible to the
scrutiny of our moral determinations.
While Nietzsche’s model of agency resolves the skeptical concerns outlined
above by avoiding problematic strategies of valuation which are generated by or
validated through foundational determinations, many of Nietzsche’s narratives of human
agency employ language which appears oddly inconsistent with the postulates of his own
theories. Frequently, Nietzsche encourages the existential freedom to forge our own
accounts of self: for example, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche urges, “What does your
conscience say? – ‘You should become who you are.’” 18 Later in the same text, he
writes, “We, however, want to become who we are – human beings who are new, unique,
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves!” 19 If we reject the

GM §I.13
GS §335; Nietzsche subverts the Socratic axiom, “Know thyself.” Editor Brian Williams also notes that
this is an inversion of the German expression, “Everyone is closest to themselves.”
16
GM §I.13
17
Ridley (2018, 17)
18
GS §270
19
GS §335
14
15
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notion of a “doer behind the deed,” then we may question where the agency which lends
coherence to this project of existential creativity originates. What is this voice of
conscience, and how do we give weight to its judgments, if it is not something we can
infer to actually exist?
Alexander Nehamas argues that Nietzsche views our tendency to reify the self and
the world as a kind of abstraction – a desire to re-conceptualize the process of
“becoming” as the state of being (in this case, the ego self), and then to project this
outward, and into the world. 20 Is it possible to accept that our models of self and agency
are in a sense a fiction and still commit to their validity, and find them valuable on these
terms? As Nehamas claims, in pursuing these abstractions, Nietzsche is not contradicting
himself by positing that which he explicitly rejects – a fixed and stable essence of self.
Nietzsche is only attempting to explore the implications of an existential habit that we are
already engaged with – the process of “aestheticizing” life. For Nietzsche, the world that
we engage with is analogous to a kind of literary narrative, and we are characters
enacting its plot through different forms of living. 21 This does not imply that such
narratives, while lacking any attainable objective correlate, are without meaning or value.
We accept some works of literature as fiction and are still moved by fictional elements,
and are able to consistently evaluate some narratives as superior to others.
We can see where conventional prescriptive strategies of ethics go awry in
attempting to reify dynamic processes into a static entity. In designating a specific
account of the way the world is as the fixed and authoritative fact of the matter, the
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corollary presumptions that follow from this static account are already out of sync with
the fluid world of human experience.
As Nehamas argues, Nietzsche understands that all accounts of the world are
necessarily perspectival and so the parameters of perspectives expressed in these
accounts in turn reveal what we value in them. In fact, for Nietzsche, a “perspective-less”
objective view of the world is conceptually incoherent (GM III.12). Every time we
provide an account of the world, we must necessarily do so from our particular
perspective, which is necessarily limited to a specific range of experiences. In describing
the world, we must exclude something of it – that which is outside of our range of
knowledge. But also, we choose a range of particulars from among our experiences and
emphasize what we deem to be valuable to express in the account. These collective
exclusions and inclusions comprise an individual perspective on human life. In the same
way that an artist must limit their focus to which elements they would see represented in
a particular work, every individual draws upon different preferences and patterns in
constructing their own account of the world and pulling these elements together in a
meaningful way. 22 Living a particular kind of life is therefore a product of choices, and
these choices reflect the value sets of agents. This process warrants scrutiny, as in some
cases, these exclusions can constitute a kind of “epistemic violence” – the oppression of
those viewpoints that are rejected from the narrative.
On Nietzsche’s perspectivist view, value norms and judgments arise out of
particular views of the self as a kind of coherent fiction – a conventional account of these
perspectives embodied in a narrative of agency. The search for the ground of agency
22
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which is expressing these perspectives leads us back into a regress, but this does not
mean that we can or should discount the validity of perspectives on that basis. Our notion
of agency is in a sense a fiction, but only in the same sense that any perspective of the
world is. Nietzsche’s rejection of the ground of agency and then subsequent invocation of
the concept of agency is essentially a narrative of one who creates narratives. Rather than
accepting the default narrative we are pressured into by the circumstances in which we
live, Nietzsche urges that we express a will to create our own narrative of selfhood, and
embody the kind of agent we should wish to be. 23 This implies a prescription of a specific
kind of will toward agency. Agency is something that by definition requires active
engagement with one’s own activity; if we internalize the habits and rules of others, then
strictly speaking, we are not agents, we are automatons.
The emphasis on where the agency to create agency originates becomes less
problematic, as long as we recognize agency in this sense as untethered to the kind of
metaphysical objectivity that MPS presumes. In any account of agency and the world,
some features are affirmed as the most relevant aspects of a particular subject, and always
represented as such from some specific point of view. The world is an intersubjective
field of these perspectival accounts of being. Our narratives of self and world comprise a
coherent understanding of what we take to be forms that particular ways of living may
take. Value norms arise as we judge these narratives against one another. As abstractions
of what truth we may actually know, we may consider the content of existential
narratives, and examine our responses to them, unencumbered by the entanglements of
global skepticism and metaphysical necessity. In short, narratives, in their range of
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representing ways of living, are by default, means of communicating values. 24 This is not
to say that Nietzsche proceeds as if there are no other constraints on his process of value
formation, or that all narratives hold equal value.
How exactly do we quantify the moral content of a specifically Nietzschean
existential narrative? If we embrace the freedom to create our own meaning through ways
of living, within what moral parameters should we exercise this freedom, according to
Nietzsche? The most consistent way that Nietzsche answers this question is rather simple:
we should live in such a way that embodies a beautiful kind of “narrative” of life, rather
than one which is mediocre, grotesque, or otherwise repellent. 25 Ultimately, the way of
life that Nietzsche consistently advocates in is writings, and by extension the apparent
objective of his moral thought, is the actualization of a kind of aesthetic ideal. Nietzsche
encourages us “[...]to be poets of our lives, starting with the smallest and most
commonplace details.” 26 Specifically, for Nietzsche, this entails ways of living that
demonstrate a kind of existential creativity, authenticity, and the agency to create
meaning. Nietzsche’s critiques of morality (to be elaborated further in Chapter 2) are
nothing more than a rebuke of those systems which fail to instantiate a beautiful narrative
of human life, as well as the tendency of society in its various forms to reinforce those
stagnant systems. Not everyone is capable of fully exercising this kind of radical
existential freedom, but for those who are, it becomes a kind of responsibility. 27
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1.3 Nietzsche’s Aesthetics of Existence: Truth, Part Two
To interpret Nietzsche’s moral judgments through the lens of aesthetics requires a
minor shift in conventional axiology. Nietzsche frequently blurs the distinctions between
categories of value, and in his writings artistic modes of evaluation become generalizing
principles which contribute to a variety of ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological
arguments. Consequently, in developing his critiques, Nietzsche’s aesthetic ideas shed
some light on questions normally reserved for ethical discourse, and good moral behavior
often exemplifies qualities of artistic merit. However, this view is not entirely
controversial; in ethical discourse, judgments are often expressed in aesthetic terms; good
moral conduct exemplifies a kind of beauty. 28 As Daniel Came observes, the quality of
“virtue” is not merely a reflection of the capacity to perform the right kind of moral
action, but also a quality which stands as a possible object of aesthetic appreciation. 29
For Nietzsche, in the wake of the collapse of MPS, the aesthetic mode of
reflection becomes the primary (and possibly only) available vehicle of moral evaluation.
Given the failure of conventional normative strategies, we are more reliably justified in
judging actions in the same way that we would evaluate a work of fiction or of visual
art. 30 In this way, we may derive a conceptual exemplar which is both ethical and
aesthetic – foundational to our notion of an idealized and abstracted self. We create the
notion of a human being whose conduct embodies qualities of aesthetic merit, or
alternately, fails to do so in some significant way. We use this exemplar as a point of
comparison to our own conduct, and the conduct of others. The process of aligning
Came (2014, 128)
Ibid. 130
30
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28
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ourselves with a “worthy” aesthetic paradigm is a highly stable way of grounding our
moral commitments, motivating our actions, and imbuing our lives with meaning.
The idea of “living beautifully” as a moral end is not the extent of Nietzsche’s
moral innovations, nor is this idea exclusive to his philosophy. Beauty is a concept
which, no different than the moral idea of the “good,” is contingent upon specific
evaluative frameworks. For Plato, a life lived in accord with principles most accurately
reflecting the abstract metaphysical realm of the forms instantiates both moral and
aesthetic ideals - albeit imperfect manifestations of the absolute perfection which funds
our knowledge and experience of all things. 31 Similarly, Aristotle locates the highest
moral achievement in a kind of cultivated harmony between the world and the faculties of
human reason by which virtue (ἀρετή) is developed and maintained. The exemplar of the
virtues stands as an object of aesthetic reflection. 32 In each of these cases, the object of
aesthetic value follows from the demonstration of a specific kind of ontological
perfection. 33 Simply, for both Plato and Aristotle, some level of human perfection is
possible, and different degrees of this perfection manifest beauty to variable extent. Both
good action and beauty are values measured against the objective model.
This kind of classical eudaimonism, the ideological traces of which extend well
into enlightenment traditions and beyond, strikes Nietzsche as naively optimistic about
the possible harmony between human beings and the world we inhabit. 34 To understand
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why, it is helpful to restate a general summary of the eudaemonist thesis in terms of two
related arguments: 1) The world is rational, and therefore, by extension, human beings
are rational parts of it. Further, because of this harmonious relationship between human
beings and the world, we are well-suited to the endeavor of discovering a way to fulfill
our flourishing, by virtue of natural rational capacities to do so, and the availability and
possibility of such flourishing within this world. Through a rigorous kind of intersubjective discourse (philosophy), we can more precisely determine principles and
actions best in accord with these pursuits. Contingent to this argument, we may have
some kinds of responsibilities (moral duties) toward others and in accommodation of
their own pursuits of flourishing based upon these same facts. 2) It is in the best interests
of human beings, as rational beings seeking a life in harmony with a rational world, to
pursue the kinds of rigorous discourse outlined above and to accept the ethical and
metaphysical foundations they presume. In fact, the philosophical tradition initiated by
Socrates holds our suffering to be a necessary symptom of our ignorance regarding the
true nature of these foundational concepts. 35 If classical eudaimonism holds knowledge
up as an aesthetic ideal, then it follows that ignorance and falsehood are conditions which
constitute aesthetic flaws.
The first argument of the thesis stated above faces the skeptical challenge: the
nature of the world which Socratic/Aristotelian eudaimonism presumes may not actually
exist, or if it does, we can never reliably determine it as a necessary truth-condition from
which to derive normative arguments. While the skeptical challenge is a problem for the
thesis overall, Nietzsche is more consistently critical of the corollary argument, which
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entails the deceptively convenient notion that the capacities of human reason are wellsuited to reveal necessary truths of the world, and that through this inquiry we may
discover the ideals of moral and aesthetic worth, and thereby achieve the highest possible
level of human flourishing.
Because Plato’s Socrates professes that our suffering is related to our fundamental
state of ignorance, he prescribes that we should systematically relinquish all illusions in
search of the truth which they obscure, even as limited as this foundation of truth happens
to be. 36 On the surface, this seems like a worthwhile objective, but for Nietzsche, the
problem is that the promise of Socrates represents a more pernicious kind of illusion. We
bury disagreeable truths only by replacing them with a lie – the aforementioned assertion
that the search for truth will facilitate an end to human suffering. 37 But any reliably
truthful inquiry will eventually reveal that suffering is inescapable, and that to believe
otherwise is a reckless delusion. 38 As Nietzsche warns, even the advances of scientific
inquiry, driven by the same epistemic optimism of Socrates, will reach its limits, and give
way to the “boundless” frontier of the unknown, leaving only the “tragic knowledge” of
our circumstances in its wake. 39 We cannot therefore pursue flourishing in the Socratic
sense because we cannot consistently avoid meaningless suffering once we have
unraveled the truth of its necessity. Ultimately, then, the Socratic account of the universe
is both aesthetically and epistemically deficient; there is nothing aesthetically meaningful
to be derived in its fiction, nor is there any well-founded truth to be reached in its inquiry.
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Nietzsche warns us that any rigorous inquiry into the nature of the world, to the
extent that this is possible, only appears to support a fundamental disharmony between
ourselves and the world. 40 Rather than being well-suited for the pursuit of flourishing,
our rational capacities may only lead us so far as the realization that the world is actually
a horrible place for us, a place of suffering. In other words, there is no ontological fit such
as that which the Socratic tradition presumes, and so rather than mitigating human
suffering, the truthful inquiry may actually make suffering worse by reaffirming it as an
inescapable condition of existence. The project of eudaimonism is therefore selfdefeating. Consequently, as Socratic truth-seekers we may be deluding ourselves about
the possibility of a world that is compatible with the ends and aims of human necessity
and flourishing, leading us to confront the so-called “wisdom of Silenus,” which
Nietzsche famously cites in The Birth of Tragedy:
“Wretched, ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do you force
me to tell you the very thing which it would be most profitable for you not to hear?
The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach not to have been born, not to be,
to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die soon.” 41
At this stage, in terms of Nietzsche’s metaphysical commitments, the pursuit of
truth is at least problematic. An honest account of our condition only appears to reinforce
the argument of antinatalism - the idea that existing at all is a bad thing for us. 42 Worse,
according to Nietzsche, the effort actually has succeeded in falsifying placating
ontological narratives, including art, philosophy, religion, and myth — means by which
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life was previously made bearable. 43 Not only have we destabilized the epistemic security
of these institutional structures, but we have come to recognize that our faculties for
understanding the world are inescapably fallible. 44 In a modern (post-Socratic) world we
must confront the growing awareness that the search for truth has dislodged the primary
means by which truth itself has previously been justified as a worthwhile pursuit. In
reality, complete truth is ultimately beyond our reach, and comforting fictions can no
longer survive within the narrow range of truth that constitutes our experience. To
continue to follow the path down which philosophy has led us is to face the twofold
danger of a groundless metaphysics (and therefore ethics), and a life of suffering
amplified by the growing awareness that this life is hopelessly meaningless.
The concerns outlined above motivate the existential questions at the heart of
Nietzsche’s philosophy: without access to truth, how do we derive meaning? Without
meaning, how do we live? Is it possible to successfully refute the nihilism of Silenus?
Fortunately, the incompatibility of truth and flourishing does not negate the possibility of
a worthwhile life. It is simply the case that flourishing in the classical sense is not a
realistic goal, given the conditions of existence. Nietzsche rejects the
Socratic/Aristotelian focus on the synchronicity between truth and flourishing but does
not reject that which he holds to be more fundamental: the value of the pursuit of
meaning. For Nietzsche, it is not the case that we are incapable of enduring the necessary
suffering of existence, but rather that we are incapable of bearing this suffering
meaninglessly. As he states in On the Genealogy of Morals, “[humanity’s] problem was
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not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, ‘why do I
suffer?’” 45 Historically, the philosophical pursuit of truth has not answered this question,
but only revealed it as unanswerable. This is a problem for us, as the kind of beings that
can bear significant levels of adversity and unhappiness as long as there is some
justification, some reason for our suffering. But too frequently, the further we investigate
into the nature of our circumstances, we can only discover that there is no such meaning
to be found, and no reasonable response to this “crying question” of suffering.
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche famously pronounces that, “only as an
aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified.” 46 What this means
is that in art the question of suffering finds an answer. Suffering is made meaningful in
the effects that forms of art have on the way that we process suffering. In art, we may
conceive a vision of the world in which unbearable truth is mediated through an
“aestheticized,” and therefore more manageable perspective. 47 In this way, we may frame
groundless suffering in such a way that it is reconfigured as comprehensible, meaningful.
A tragic life is painful for the one who lives it, but there is also beauty in the art of
the tragic narrative, and myth prompts us to recognize ways that such a life can exemplify
this kind of narrative beauty. 48 In the tragic, and in acceptance of the horrifying truth of
things, there is still an affirmation of our condition taking place, and we are moved by it.
We may recognize the painful elements of tragedy as trivial when compared to the
sublimity of the overwhelming reality it expresses. Nietzsche argues that in
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mythologizing existence, the pre-Socratic narratives contextualize human suffering as a
small but necessary feature of cosmic narratives. 49 In this way, the infamous declaration
of Silenus stands as an account which casts the protagonist Midas as a tragic figure
worthy of the audience’s empathy. For human beings, even to endure meaningfully in the
face of otherwise meaninglessness becomes its own noble form of living. While the
hubris of Midas in demanding access to this knowledge reveals a kind of character flaw,
as the audience we do not hope for Midas to succumb to Silenus’ warning, but instead to
embody a further kind of nobility inherent in a specific narrative of exemplary humanity
— when confronted with the horror of existence to keep on living anyway. For Nietzsche,
myths such as this illustrate some of the advantages we have sacrificed in the progress
through Socratism toward Modernity. For Nietzsche, Socratism does not represent a
refinement of cultural progress, but rather a decline; in the advent of Socratic thought, the
cultural sicknesses which give rise to stagnant narratives and modes of thought are
allowed to take root in society and proliferate. 50 MPS is a product of this decline.
If the best possible consolation for suffering lies in myth, then it would follow
that, as an ordinary matter of practice, we should make effort to interpret and represent
the world fictionally. But to what degree should we attempt this, and how exactly? Even
if we accept the premise that what is best for us is to fabricate our own account of our
reality, this raises numerous questions. If fictionalizing our existential narratives in the
manner of Attic myth is accepted as beneficial to our well-being, then what prevents us
from embracing delusional falsehoods completely, and devising fabrications far-removed
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from the accepted veracity of the so-called “factual” level of experience? There are
certainly those who have gravitated in this direction, fabricating spurious narratives, often
in order to affirm their own values or motives. Nietzsche is no less critical of those who
conceal self-interested mores and beliefs within foundational narratives in order to exert
power over others than he is of those who dogmatically accept and absorb them without
challenge. 51
How do we balance what we need to know with what would be “most profitable”
for us not to hear? 52 Fictionalizing the way that we view our conditions of living appears
to involve a strange kind of self-delusion. Is this self-delusion even possible? Can we act
based upon information that we already suspect may be false? Can we ever accept a state
of affairs in which our actions are not guided by the belief in foundational knowledge, but
by the acceptance of a fiction? Even if we hold that on some level we occasionally make
sense of our world by filling in gaps in our knowledge in order to construct an intelligible
narrative of life, we still generally prefer this narrative to represent truth in some
significant way. A minor exaggeration or error would likely not disrupt the entire
narrative, but extensively contrived or easily falsifiable premises might lead to its
collapse, and the consequent problems of enduring life in the wake of such a collapse.
One such unsound narrative is that which Nietzsche refers to as the “ascetic
ideal.” By this kind of account, human suffering is made comprehensible by introducing
a universal “guilt” in which all human beings participate – sin. 53 Under this ideal, the
necessity of suffering is not irrational, for God exacts a measure of universal justice, and
I will expand upon this claim in Chapter 2.
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our suffering serves as a kind of atonement. However, in the wake of the collapse of
religious systems corresponding to the rise of enlightenment rationalism, suffering has
once again become meaningless, and ontological claims have become ungrounded.
Nietzsche’s figure of the “lantern-wielding madman” warns us that in the aftermath of
this upheaval, we are left to wonder whether all such claims are rendered useless:
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Where is it
moving to now? Where are we moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not
continually falling? And backwards, sidewards, forwards, in all directions? Is
there still an up and a down? 54
The failure of systems such as religion and Socratism implies a growing
awareness that our values cannot be grounded in any consistent or necessary truths, but
only arbitrary associations.
1.4 The Apollonian, the Dionysian, and the Bridge Between
It is difficult to ignore the metaphysical intuition addressed earlier: that our
experience of the world is reducible to a duality of truth and illusion. Conventionally, we
understand truth to equivalent to that which represents the absolute underlying reality of
things, and the way that things appear to us may or may not actually correspond to this
reality in any meaningful way. 55 Again, our unease arises from the concern that truth is
ultimately either inaccessible or dangerous to pursue, and that illusion is founded on that
which we cannot trust as reliable. This leads us to speculate about the most manageable
balance between the two. To miscalculate is to risk reliance upon untenable epistemic
foundations, to become misled by meaningless delusions, or worst of all, to actually
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uncover the terrible and unendurable reality which grounds our experiences of things.
Nietzsche gives us many examples in which societal norms incorrectly prescribe this
balance, but what kind of narrative model entails a successful synthesis of truth and
illusion, while still representing an authentic narrative of human life on Nietzsche’s
terms?
For Nietzsche, truth and illusion find optimal balance in the specific form of the
pre-Socratic mythical narratives of Attic tragedy. As illustrated in the example of Midas
and Silenus, Attic myths frame the underlying truth of human existence as a
representation of our relationship to a superseding cosmic order. According to Nietzsche,
through myth we confront the ongoing dialectic tension between truth and illusion, and it
consists in the impulse to embrace and affirm the most honest account of our relationship
to an overwhelming world (the Dionysian impulse) competing with the impulse to temper
that account in tolerable layers of fictionalization (the Apollonian impulse). 56 In the most
successful balance, these two primal forces complement one another – the Apollonian
impulses restraining the Dionysian from a completely self-destructive awareness of the
human condition, while the Dionysian revitalizes the rigidly safe and ordered Apollonian
narratives. If such a state of harmony were to be achieved, we would not suffer
excessively in knowledge, nor would we stagnate in repulsive states of self-delusion. This
is not to say that such a harmony would resolve in a static condition – on this account the
tension between these forces is dynamic and ongoing, a constant intrusion of one upon
the other.
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Harmony is an aesthetic ideal, but it is not one that exists in the world prior to our
appraisal of it, at least in the sense that classical ontology presumes. In response to
Nietzsche’s rejection of the possible harmony between human beings and the world; there
is no such underlying harmony because there is no orchestrated harmony within the
world itself. We are merely elements of an indifferent network of dynamic processes, and
as such, we are subject to its random nature. We are susceptible to the potential harm of
states of disorder, as subjects capable of experiencing suffering. It is comforting for us to
psychologize the world of morally indifferent processes, or to otherwise render the
meaningless meaningful by imposing a rational order that is not actually present.
Mythical narratives acknowledge the discord of the world and render it as something
relatable to human experience, framed in familiar ways.
As functions of their respective roles in mythical narratives, the gods bear specific
characteristics. Apollo is closely associated with the “plastic” arts, such as sculpture and
architecture, and as such represents the influence of precision and measure. In the
Apollonian, the world is rational, and ordered into intelligible categories. Conversely,
Dionysus is embodied in drunkenness, divine “madness,” and euphoric religiosity, as the
manifestation of the unpredictable, irrational processes at the heart of nature. 57 The
essence of the Dionysian influence lies in those “dangerous” and disagreeable truths that
we may wish to shield ourselves from in the Apollonian. We may be too often tempted by
the unrealistically optimistic view that our world should disproportionately reflect
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expressions of the safely ordered and intelligible Apollonian rather than the dangerous
and disordered Dionysian. 58
The problem, Nietzsche suggests, is that in withdrawing from the Dionysian, we
recede further into self-delusive narratives, but self-delusion is a limited consolation, as it
is easily refuted through our experience. It is evident to us that human existence is not a
safe or painless state of being, otherwise the insular security of previously collapsed
existential narratives would never have developed to harbor the individual to begin with.
In contrast to Apollonian narratives, Dionysus does not promise to shelter us with
happiness or to free us from suffering in his ecstatic departures; he instead promises
access to authentic existential truths. Central among these truths is the awareness that to
exist is to regularly face one's own destruction, and to acknowledge this is to affirm the
pull of the Dionysian.
1.5 The Aesthetics of Existence: Beyond Truth & Illusion
Nietzsche’s philosophy, while related by common threads of a unified critique of
conventional structures, often reflects a shifting and discordant view of the relationship
between art and truth, and the impact of this dialectic tension on our conceptions of
human life. Similarly, the aforementioned “apparent incongruities” in Nietzsche’s moral
thought can be interpreted as representing a progress through different stages of his
confrontation with the project of truthful inquiry, and the possibility of this project under
the conditions in which we exist.
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The idea that we temper our experience of reality with some degree of
fictionalization in order to make life more bearable implies access to a reality against
which our accounts may be measured as fictional. If some account of the world is more
or less truthful or fictional, then there must be a foundational level of experience which
stands as the criterion of truth, and we must be able to know something substantial about
it. However, we cannot commit to the metaphysical accuracy of any account of the world
if our truthful inquiries have only proven that our faculties for processing and
understanding the world truthfully are inescapably fallible. Beyond The Birth of Tragedy,
a notable shift occurs in Nietzsche’s metaphysical commitments which appears to
acknowledge this problem. Instead of approaching aestheticized accounts of the world as
interpretations which falsify or fictionalize an objective truth about the way the world
actually is, Nietzsche begins to suggest that individual accounts of reality are importantly
constitutive of that reality. This refinement in Nietzsche’s view acknowledges that the
world is comprised of a plurality of individual perspectives, and that none of them are
more privileged in terms of their correspondence to an objective truth of things. 59 Once
again, though, this does not imply that all narratives hold equal value for us, when
measured against aesthetic criteria.
If all that we have access to are the stories that we tell ourselves – about
ourselves, and about our world — then what does it mean to “suffer” from the truth, and
to need to fabricate a new framework by which to experience this truth? There is no
substratum of reality that gives rise to the various metaphorical interpretations we impose
onto it, whether we designate them as accurate or erroneous. What we hold to be truth is
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always a perspective — truth from a particular view. 60 Nietzsche’s shift in metaphysical
commitments involves a move beyond questions such as “what is truth?” and “Is there
truth at all?”, leading us to the question of which “truths” are worthy of accepting.
However, a perspectivist view does not mean there is no value in the world; it means that
the value that we derive is not a necessary feature of the world which is independent of
the subjective experience of that world.
This leaves us with an apparent dilemma – how can a perspectival account tell us
anything important about the world if it has no truthful connection to that world? The
answer: in a purely objective sense, it cannot. We have already established that a
metaphysically necessary “truthful” state of being either does not exist or is too far
beyond the scope of our experience to inform any meaningful account of it. This is
actually not as great of a problem as we may take it to be. An existential perspective is a
means by which we render experiences coherent, typically in the form of a narrative of
meaningful living. The world for us is just a practical and coherent integration of
experiences that we may accept to be “caused” by that which is outside of the realm of
our experiences. We seem to be the kinds of beings that are generally very good at
generating successful frameworks by which to make sense of these experiences, and to
anticipate relationships between them. When we worry about the objective truth of
existential narratives, what we really worry about is that some of them are wrong and that
we may commit ourselves to them anyway. But with no objective grounding by which to
privilege one account over another, all accounts are equal in terms of epistemic
justification.
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Accepting the simultaneous validity of a plurality of existential narratives presents
challenges. How do we rate one perspective as superior to another? If no account of the
world is most demonstrably accurate in representing it, then why would we advocate for
it instead of others? The same holds true for moral valuation; how can we appraise the
actions of one individual as preferable to those of another if we have no means of
claiming one to be objectively morally grounded? If every way of living reflects a kind of
narrative grounded in the values expressed by an agent, then we must worry about moral
relativism, which is a short path to moral nihilism. Relativism is a challenge to the
proposition that there is such a thing as value, that our norms are grounded. Clearly
Nietzsche is no relativist, as a driving focus of his philosophy involves arguing the
inferiority of various conventional beliefs and normative systems to his own views.
Once again, the aesthetic paradigm offers a possible response to this problem. For
Nietzsche, we are reliably justified in evaluating our actions (collectively constitutive of
an account of human life) in the same way that we would evaluate a work of art. 61 This
may be a strange proposition for us to accept because, among other concerns, it seems
logical to assume that impressions of a “fictionalized” world would have significantly
less normative impact than a truthful account of the world, whatever we take that to be.
However, aesthetic reflection is actually an effective mode of action guidance because it
entails specific aversions to properties which we hold to be repellent or grotesque. 62 In
terms of an aesthetic account of human life (a narrative), this aesthetic reflection extends
to include the habits and behaviors of agents (characters). On this model, we effectively
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become the audience and critics of our own existential narratives. 63 We can evaluate the
perspectives represented in the form the narrative takes and determine whether this kind
of life embodies aesthetic value.
Even if we acknowledge the aesthetic model as an indirect grounding for
prescriptive ethics, it may seem problematic that, hypothetically, nothing discourages us
from outlandish exaggerations far removed from, if not objective truth, then that which is
commonly accepted to be the truth of things. There are two possible responses to this
concern that are consistent with Nietzsche’s views. First, many examples of this kind of
“exaggerated” narrative have features that render them flawed on a number of aesthetic
criteria. These flaws may include behaviors which are either so out of sync with the
circumstances of the narrative that they contribute to its overall incoherence, or behaviors
which are motivated by concealed interests which are themselves aesthetically odious.
Alternately, that which appears to us as a radical divergence from an anticipated narrative
pattern could actually represent the kind of radical existential creativity which Nietzsche
praises. The field of existential possibility is unforgivingly indeterminate, leaving us to
speculate what choices we should make in establishing aesthetic-existential frameworks.
If we intend to understand what it specifically means to us to judge existence on
aesthetic grounds, then we need to elaborate which specific ways of living hold aesthetic
merit for us, and which ethical strategies are flawed on this basis. In conceiving of life as
a coherent narrative, we assume a more or less complete picture of the world, making it
accessible to our ethical and metaphysical speculation. In a sense, human beings are both
the artists as well as the work they create. For Nietzsche, it is the artists who, like
63
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physicians diluting a remedy until it is more tolerable, know what “fictionalized”
elements to combine in forming this picture, and in what measures. 64 We come to value
artists as those who are “experts” at successfully identifying and representing something
meaningful in the world. 65
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche equates the philosopher’s relationship to
metaphysics with the artist’s relationship to the illusory state of dreams. 66 Whereas the
philosopher posits narrative accounts of existence which intend truth, the artist is
comfortable with accepting illusion. Both are creating an account of reality. What
distinguishes Nietzsche’s perspectivism from his earlier views is that in adopting an
existential perspective, we are not strategically deluding ourselves by masking truth with
illusion; we are embracing a truth. In this way, the roles of philosopher and artist collapse
into one. Philosophy leads us to become artists of existence, the exemplars of creating
exemplars.
The puzzling part of Nietzsche’s analogy is that it returns us to the
Apollonian/Dionysian dialectic of truth and illusion. But in acceptance of the awareness
that any presumed truth can only ever be an expression of perspective, it is difficult to
reconcile these views without softening the commitment to truth as metaphysical
necessity. If there is no perspective or narrative that bears any necessary relationship to
foundational truth, then what do the Dionysian and the Apollonian impulses really
represent? I have discussed how the Dionysian impulse implies the existence of a truth
over and above whatever narrative we adopt in order to make life meaningful and
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therefore sufferable. But this is itself a narrative perspective of existence — the idea that
we endure the unendurable by effecting some agency to exert control over it and make it
meaningful through our own powers of existential creativity, ideally without withdrawing
into the supposed safety of excessive self-delusion.
Nietzsche argues that we exist immersed in an ongoing dialectic tension between
impulses toward truth and impulses toward illusion, but the meaning of this conflict is
contingent upon how we understand these forces to actually represent features of our
existence. We may understand the dialectic as an existential narrative of authenticity — a
perspective representing the conflict of an unrestrained truth of existence, suppressed by
pressures toward a safe and structured mode of living. On this view, the tension as
previously stated still stands: Apollonian illusion is excessively optimistic about the
world and Dionysian truth is excessively pessimistic – at least from the perspective of
individuation of the self, and neither on its own lends itself to the exemplary narrative of
existence. Nietzsche’s narrative of authenticity portrays the Dionysian impulse as more
reflective of reality than the Apollonian illusion by juxtaposing an account of life lived
according to standing conventional frameworks with existence forged in clear defiance of
them. The narrative prompts us to see the truth “between the cracks” in the standing
narrative, to question what is actually being repressed by the comforting veil of illusion.
Through the way that we navigate this balance, we have access to the possibility of living
meaningfully.
Society itself is founded and maintained on a variety of narratives. On one such
narrative, the principal function of “civilizing” pressures consists in the repression and
elimination of some natural human tendencies with the general intent of establishing and
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preserving an ordered (and presumably thereby safer) type of existence for all
participants of a society. Because human beings are on some levels a danger to
themselves and to one another, systems of rules and privations have developed to restrict
some actions in the interest of our own preservation. By such an account, social
organization is merely a pragmatic bargain for us; in civilization we are bound together in
a communal defense against the elements of the natural world which would endanger our
survival. In exchange for this kind of insurance against extinction, we relinquish the
unbound freedom of some of the most destructive of our primitive impulses. 67 This
narrative holds that such rational restrictions are imposed upon individual liberty in order
that specific patterns of social organization may endure, and social harmony may thereby
be preserved. A tension may also arise, however, when the actions of some individuals
diverge, and threaten the social harmony of this structure from within. Society must
therefore maintain not only a level of resistance to harmful external forces, but a code of
laws which aim to prevent the disruption of its internal order as well.
Some existential narratives embody our concern that society’s system of
privations extends too far and fundamentally limits something authentic in our expression
of the narrative of human nature. The worry is that effects of systematized repression
only amplify the very dangers they seek to minimize. 68 In the Bacchae of Euripides,
Dionysus stands as a threat to the rational realm of society: he is the part of the world that
is still unfamiliar, the unheimlich – formless. Dionysian formlessness is itself an affront
to one of the most fundamental presuppositions of the Apollonian narrative — the
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principle of individuation. Nietzsche speaks of the “blissful ecstasy which arises at the
collapse of the principium individuationis.” 69 The erosion of conventional differentiations
between self and world, as well as between self and other selves, may be interpreted as
destruction to those whose conception of existence is still grounded in the Apollonian
narratives of society. But as the balance shifts away from the Apollonian perspective, the
Dionysian subject revels in the advance of this collapse of identity. The weakening of
barriers of individuation and differentiation is represented as a kind of healing, and
acceptance of a more honest ontological account — one that acknowledges human nature
as being at least partially at odds with the civilizing pressures of society’s imposed
categories.
However, when the barriers of reason fall away and orderly Apollonian structures
begin to reveal their inadequacy, it is not merely the case that human beings are
unleashed from the constraints of society's network of rules and privations, but that they
are forced into the orderless unknown. Anything that is known relies upon a conventional
distinction between that thing itself and that which is not that thing.70 The state of the
unknown is so to us only because it represents the region where what we know runs out,
where that which defies categorization is now the prevailing reality. The form that the
god Dionysus takes fluctuates, and so it can be said that his essence is the absence of any
fixed essence. 71 This itself is a subversion of society's categories, which intend toward
universally and metaphysically grounded principles, but cannot admit the particularity
which stands outside of their prescriptive order. A completely rational model of the world
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will always demonstrate its systematic inefficacy in the failure to account for exception.
The Dionysian is the particularity at odds with the Apollonian universal, and in the
Dionysian the inescapable flaw in the system is made more obvious to us. 72
In the Bacchae, it is through the arrival of Dionysus on Earth that the mandates of
society are disrupted, and that the pull of the irrational subverts the order of existing
rational structures. The Dionysian is revealed as other in juxtaposition to dominant
normalized institutions and ideologies, which are likewise only revealed in their
difference through this dialectic. The narrative of the Bacchae also suggests that through
this tension, an underlying natural state of being which is primordial to societal
institutions is restored in the re-emergence of the influence of Dionysus himself. When
Pentheus, King of Thebes, attempts to have the newly emerged Dionysus bound and
imprisoned, Dionysus proclaims, “I am sane. I will not be bound by the insane.” 73
Dionysus continues, “You don't even know who you are.” This scene implies a reversal
of a more conventional view of wellness and “normality”; for the God Dionysus, to deny
the “insane” element within us all is clearly the true state of aberration. Dionysus accuses
Pentheus of ignorance of, or worse – of willful rejection of his own nature. In driving the
occupants of Thebes insane, Dionysus has not corrupted them, but reconciled them with a
more honest ontological narrative, encouraging characteristics that were already present
and giving them free reign. 74 From this perspective, Dionysus is not a destroyer, but a
restorer, and the civilizing pressures of society are what are afflicting us.
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The Bacchae narrative expresses a perspective of unease directed at the structures
of civilization. The disruption of the presumed stability of social order may only be
amplified through a failure to acknowledge some element of disorder inherent in
individuals, and through regulations that bind groups of individuals to a flawed narrative
of social order. Dionysus reminds us that we cannot hide from the truth behind an
Apollonian facade and go on living as if the occluded “truth” is not still there waiting for
us. Pentheus, in attempting to interfere with the influence of Dionysus, represents that
repressive force in society, and his ultimate fate reflects the danger of overzealous
restraint of primordial being in conventional individuation. 75 As a meta-narrative framing
our relationship to truth through fictional narrative form, Bacchae illustrates an
inescapable reality: that some fundamental truths cannot be concealed indefinitely. The
existential perspectives which embody aesthetic value are likely to be ones which frame
existence in a way that yields a beautiful narrative, but not ones which embellish our
experiences with naive optimism. Whatever narrative that we embrace will require some
rhetorical mechanism to account for the essential discord which appears prevalent in both
individuals and social structures.
Society relies upon an array of standing universal norms for its function, and
pressures individuals to condition themselves to operate successfully within these norms.
To deviate from these norms often entails punishment or stigmatization. We may accept
that some normalized restrictions are beneficial, but social systems also often restrict the
vital innovation which is necessary to prevent the stagnation of the greater societal
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narrative when new cultural conditions outgrow old practices. Innovation is usually
punctuated at an individual level, and social structures are slower to evolve. Some
individuals display unique capacities to step outside of culturally conditioned modes of
experiencing and interpreting the world, and in the process, expand our collective norms
beyond sets of outmoded or regressive conventional practices. Through their actions
these exemplar individuals in turn originate exemplar narratives — more refined
perspectives on human life, and on what it in fact means to be a human being under the
circumstances in which we live.
Returning to the existential-aesthetic model, we find that there is something
aesthetically favorable, or beautiful, in what we consider to be good moral character, and
something aesthetically flawed in what we consider to be bad moral character. 76 Neither
of these are valenced according to standing universal principles of good and bad, but are
contingent to the context of a moral narrative, which is in turn contingent upon a complex
of perspectives which comprise more broad cultural narratives. Some properties of
character which would drive an individual to find value and meaning outside of standing
cultural norms of valuation may hold positive aesthetic merit analogous to those of
artistic innovation. Alternately, stubborn commitments to outdated and purposeless
norms are likely to prompt negative aesthetic valuation, as if in response to art which
lacks originality. 77 Nietzsche’s exemplars are those individuals who embody creative
ways of living primarily by advancing new ways of exploring the meaning behind the
concepts that ground our existence. In this way, cultural innovations are perpetuated,
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emulated, and the propagation of previous ethical norms eventually weakens. It is evident
that Nietzsche consistently elevates the aesthetic paradigm of the nonconformist – the
philosopher for the “day after tomorrow.” 78 It is also understandable why this paradigm
usually involves a disruption of the conventional norms and values of today. A variety of
existential narratives have grounded our ethical traditions, and for Nietzsche, many of
these express questionable degrees of aesthetic worth. Recognizing in some general sense
which narratives Nietzsche dismisses, what can we say specifically about those that he
advocates? While Nietzsche does give examples of what the exemplary narrative might
look like, his writings are generally more concerned with guiding us toward the radical
freedom to create our own narratives. 79 Nietzsche does not establish himself as the
author of the new narratives, but as a kind of mentor for their future authors. If we subject
the values that are installed in different existential narratives to scrutiny, can we be sure
that they are not values which perpetuate mediocrity? 80 Do they conceal the agenda of
ressentiment? 81
I have commented that the defense of a “Nietzschean” ethics is a contradictory
kind of endeavor however we approach it, and so some points still warrant further
elaboration. We should recognize what ethical systems are generally supposed to do and
determine whether Nietzsche’s aesthetic framework can actually carry this weight, and if
it can, we should clarify how.
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1.6 The Nietzschean Exemplar Paradigm
In the most general sense that we can identify, what are our ethical obligations to
one another? In what principles are these obligations grounded? How can we know these
principles? How can we be sure that there is any necessary connection between our
ethical obligations and the principles grounding them? Ethical systems usually resolve
such questions by taking some form of metaphysical inquiry for granted — often a
presumption of essences and agency by which to derive principles which ground
normative mandates. The problem of skepticism destabilizes this foundationalist view;
systems that appeal to metaphysical grounding can never resolve their necessity. Either
we are wrong about the existence of such grounding facts, or we could be right about
them but never able to verify it. A better way to state the problem is this: if there is no
access to such a ground as foundationalist claims presume, then why do these claims
matter? Why should we care about their mandate? Ultimately, conventional ethical
systems cannot answer any of these questions with the conclusive objectivity that they
purport.
Recall the earlier critique of those conventional ethical systems which must
problematically resort to essentializing in order to justify their claims – this is the view
that what should be determined as moral behavior is contingent upon what is good for
human beings, which requires the further assumption of what a human being actually is.
However, with no access to the metaphysical grounding of “essences,” our notion of the
human being is limited to a conceptual model — a value-laden perspective; in other
words, the human being is itself a narrative construction. This is true for any strategy we
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use to fill in the indeterminate question of being, whether it is one which claims objective
metaphysical grounding or not.
In ethical discourse, we consider the moral content of our circumstances in
abstraction and then posit prescribed actions based upon these considerations. Because of
this, every ethical scenario we devise is a kind of narrative. As this discussion has
addressed, our existential narratives hold variable degrees of value for us, most reliably
measured in terms of aesthetic criteria. If our ethical norms are grounded in contingent
aesthetic values rather than a prescription of action based universal rules or duties, this
bypasses the problems of metaphysical grounding, but what normative functions take the
place of this grounding? A valuable narrative may entertain us, or may move us to an
even deeper kind of aesthetic experience, but why and how could it guide our actions?
How do we approach these kinds of claims and judgments aesthetically? What actions are
beautiful? By what means do we communicate or popularize which kinds of actions
constitute an existence which is beautiful?
Accepting Nietzsche’s view that every valuation of action necessarily emerges
from a particular perspective of human life, and the consequent claim that our very notion
of humanity is grounded in kinds of aesthetic narratives, we may still question whether
Nietzsche’s accounts entail any sufficient normative component to qualify as ethical
arguments. What kind of ethical claims and judgments are aesthetic, and what kind of
aesthetic models have the normative powers of an ethical argument? Nietzsche writes of
the consequences of choosing various modes of living, but it is unclear whether he issues
any specific calls to act upon the values expressed in his writings. In blurring
conventional categorical distinctions, is Nietzsche applying his aesthetic moral judgments
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prescriptively or only describing the underlying creative forces which impel us to express
various ways of living? 82
Though Nietzsche’s claims are contingent upon his own perspectives, in them
there is still a tacit presumption of how specific kinds of exemplar human beings tend to
act under specific conditions. Such exemplary actions may embody kinds of aesthetic
merit, inspiring us to emulate them, compelling us to act in specific ways, to embody
ways of living that are “beautiful” or otherwise engaging. Even if this is the case, and in
light of Nietzsche’s departure from objectively grounded systems, how do we determine
that specific aesthetic values in existential narratives are meant to ground our conception
of moral good? A feasible response to this question is that we are inspired to act by
properties of character – in this case, the character of exemplars. The kinds of character
traits that inspire us to act are generally those which consistently result in ways of living
that we believe to embody valued narratives of existence. This description easily
corresponds to a classical definition of the concept of virtue. 83
Recall that Nietzsche’s “expressivist” model eliminates the customary
differentiation between agency and action: “[…]the ‘doer’ is merely a fiction added to the
deed — the deed is everything.” 84 The collapse of this distinction effectively bypasses
problematic appeals to many of the indeterminate or inaccessible elements which hinder
conventional moral determinations. The overlap of Nietzsche’s expressivism with his
perspectivism leads us to a framework of moral valuation which is primarily aesthetic,
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and functionally consistent with the classical model of Virtue Ethics. 85 On the classical
model, we understand virtue as a behavior which exemplifies “good” action. The concept
of virtue is “self-reinforcing”; we come to identify good character with good action, and
vice-versa.
Because a narrative of ontological justification – i.e., what kinds of beings we are
and under what circumstances we live – lends meaning to our standing conventions of
how we should act, we are drawn to narrative forms which attempt to supply details
concerning what it means to be human. When we quantify this supposed meaning
inherent in the concept itself, our intuitions reveal that what is most fundamental to the
concept is not in its essence or form; instead, when we refer to “humanity” we have in
mind a specific range of properties, conceptually analogous to a virtue set. This virtue set
of humanity entails properties of character that can be either cultivated or neglected, and
so an exemplar type of human being is an ongoing project of moral development, not an
automatic or accidental status derived from one’s biological condition. Consequently,
what we designate as a human being is not actually a stable or fixed essence – it is a
model of striving toward a standard of being which is reflected only in the kinds of
stories we tell about human beings, both the exemplar types and those that fail to meet
the exemplary criteria. Our “narrative experiments” concerning the nature of the human
being are an imposition of meaningful existence in the face of unforgiving
meaninglessness. In revealing narrative beauty through the ethical exemplar, the concept
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of humanity is imbued with a transitory but necessary kind of worth. In a sense, we are
always refining this narrative and its presumptive guiding principles.
Nietzsche’s thought experiments provide some direction for understanding this
process, and specific formulations of the exemplar type of the human narrative. In the
exemplar life we find meaningful ways of living, but not necessarily a path to individual
flourishing. Nietzsche’s “free spirits” embrace the perspectival nature of their existential
condition and embody the radical freedom to express their role authentically and
meaningfully in the “tragic narrative” as it unfolds.
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CHAPTER 2
IN DEFENSE OF NIETZSCHEAN VIRTUE ETHICS
2.1 Introduction
In blurring the conventional distinctions between branches of axiology, is Nietzsche
developing prescriptive moral claims, or merely ruminating on the aesthetic dimensions
of different particular modes of living? The difficulties of reading Nietzsche as a moralist
are numerous, given his self-proclaimed status as an “extra-moralist.” 86 Though he
regularly argues the advantages and disadvantages of various ways of living, he is often
vague about whether these judgments entail specific calls to action, or if, as a result of his
views of agency, we are even capable of acting upon them in any meaningful way. In the
last chapter, I explored and defended the theory that a deeper understanding of
Nietzsche’s aesthetic views resolves many of the challenges associated with reconciling
his advocacy of specific values with his expansive rejection of our intuitive justification
of value. As other scholars have noted, in his articulation of the relationship between art
and life, Nietzsche proposes an alternative grounding for a unified strategy of moral
valuation, but this interpretation of Nietzsche’s ethics is only partial. 87 In order to fully
explain how Nietzsche’s aesthetic models function in a normative capacity, we must
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explore further implications of Nietzsche’s conception of agency. In bringing these two
approaches together, we can proceed with a clearer understanding of how we form value
and create existential narratives.
Accepting Nietzsche’s assertion that “only as an aesthetic phenomenon is
existence and the world eternally justified,” more must be said about the way that this
aesthetic justification functions. 88 While Nietzsche maintains that in order to thrive in the
collapse of obsolete systems we will require a special kind of existential skill-set by
which to derive new ethical conventions, and that the value of these conventions should
be based in aesthetic criteria, two rather obvious questions follow from this: what
constitutes a criterion of aesthetic merit, and who should determine such criteria? A
beautiful existential narrative may serve as a model of an exemplary kind of existence,
but which standards of beauty is it that are supposed to inspire us to follow their
example? It is perfectly plausible that those who engage in behaviors that we hold to
embody morally repugnant kinds of lifestyles and worldviews believe them to be
beautiful by their own aesthetic standards. Given the diversity of aesthetic predilections,
we must still worry about being left with no useful means of distinguishing who is right
about which ways of living are beautiful and which are not. The aim of this argument is
to demonstrate how Nietzsche can legitimately promote an aesthetic form of ethics
without risking a backslide into relativism.
Nietzsche often makes it clear that the best and most proper ways of living align
with his own values, but what is it about Nietzsche’s exemplar types that situates them as
the arbiters of value? While many of Nietzsche’s critiques involve dismantling our views
88
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of objective universal standards of “good,” there still must be something in our actions
which holds as necessarily valuable, if there is to be any inter-subjective value in our
values. In Nietzsche’s writings, those who occupy the crucial (albeit self-prescribed)
position as adjudicators of the exemplar narratives appear to possess some commonality
of character which allows them to more easily diverge from the paths ingrained in us as
humans living in the wake of modernity. In the various forms that Nietzsche’s accounts
of exemplars take, these individuals are normally represented as those who overcome
culturally conditioned adherence to the outmoded norms which comprise failing systems,
such as the ones that fall under the umbrella of Leiter’s morality in the pejorative sense
(MPS). 89
Our values arise from particular perspectives of human life, but without some
common standard, we may still question whether Nietzsche’s arguments entail any
sufficient normative component to qualify as ethical arguments. If there are no values
which are common to all, then value is relative, and our moral prescriptions are trivial —
every ethics an individual reflection on one’s own preferences and commitments. On the
other hand, in Nietzsche’s criticism of ethical systems, we find that much of what we
generally take to be universal and necessary is merely contingent — accidents of our
circumstances rather than essential features of existence. But is there anything that does
not fall into this category? How do we engage in a critique of the flawed conception of
the universal while allowing for a margin in which to construct ethical principles with
actual binding efficacy? Following Nietzsche, we may find that this margin is scant, but
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not absent. It turns out that the only universal values we can reliably accept are related to
facts about agency — what it means to perform actions at all. In human agency, there is a
bedrock of universal value in the form of Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power.
Facts about what it means to will power provide clues as to where our values originate,
and lend weight to our ethical claims, to the extent that this is possible. In Nietzsche’s
exemplar narratives, the standard of aesthetic value, and the intrinsic value of willing
power overlap.
In order to expand upon a viable model of agency as it relates to Nietzsche’s
ethics, I should first clarify some basic frameworks. More broadly construed — what
function do conventional ethical systems serve, and to what degree do Nietzsche’s
strategies align with this? Further, what are the precise failures of MPS, and through what
mechanisms are Nietzsche’s valuations more firmly grounded in valid arguments about
agency and aesthetic merit? Any response to these questions should sufficiently address
my claims about the function and formulation of Nietzsche’s exemplar narratives and
their relationship to the “human” virtue set, the consequent claim that our very notion of
what kinds of beings we are is grounded in kinds of aesthetic narratives, as well as the
way these narratives extenuate the aforementioned epistemic and metaphysical
challenges associated with the presumed foundations of morality.
In Beyond Good & Evil, Nietzsche surmises that the history of ethics can be
divided into three broad phases: pre-moral, moral, and extra-moral. In the earliest phase,
which he terms the “pre-moral” phase, value judgments were established purely with
regard to the outcome of our actions, and with no concern for determinations regarding
the actions themselves, or what sorts of causal mechanisms motivated them (such as
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intentions). 90 According to Nietzsche, in the progress from the first phase (the “premoral”) to the second phase (the “moral” phase), we have abandoned consequences in
favor of intentions as the absolute criterion of value. While the pre-moral characterizes
the largest phase of our moral development — the entire pre-history of our existence on
this planet — we are currently in the moral phase. Nietzsche argues that we have reached
the point in our progression as a species that we must make the transition to the third
phase — the “extra-moral.” 91 All of our current ethical traditions are various
manifestations of the second phase — the moral. What will this proposed third phase be
like? For Nietzsche, it will be everything that the moral has failed to be, in terms of
reliable means to ground value. Importantly, having moved past our prioritization of
outcomes, in the extra-moral we will now abandon our focus on intention, and prioritize
that which is unintentional. 92 How do we prioritize that which is unintentional? Even
more perplexing — can we intend to adopt a means to prioritize the unintentional? To
understand how Nietzsche resolves these challenges requires a deeper understanding of
the failings of the moral phase which have prompted this transition to the extra-moral,
and of how an axiology based on the unintentional will save us from these failings.
2.2 Nietzsche’s Confrontation with the Moral Phase
In most branches of ethics, basic types of ethical arguments that we can make
involve claims intended to establish how well kinds of actions conform to some criteria
of right or wrong. This statement may not seem controversial, but it suggests that an
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ethical claim presumes access to further knowledge of criteria that ground conceptions of
right and wrong, as well as how this process of justification actually works. The criteria
by which we determine what is right can take many forms, as can the manner through
which we reach these criteria. 93 In other words, a moral judgment does not occur in a
vacuum, but carries with it the baggage of its whole tradition. Thomas Brobjer argues
that, “One of the most common dichotomies made in respect to moral judgments is that
they must be based on either the consequences of an act or the intentions of the acting
person.” 94 Nietzsche’s identification of the moral phase with the criterion of intention
cannot strictly speaking be exclusively associated with the second disjunct of Brobjer’s
dichotomy; even when we employ moral theory in a way that prioritizes outcomes over
intention, we still conceive of organizing our actions with the intent of producing
favorable outcomes. As Brobjer notes, Nietzsche rejects both criteria, as each strategy
intends a level of necessity which is untenable. 95
As the familiar paradigm of intention-based ethics, an analysis of Nietzsche’s
critiques of Kant’s deontological system broadly demonstrates the overall fallacies of this
kind of ethical approach. Under Kant’s ethics, determinations about our moral failures
and successes are not contingent upon the success of our intended actions. Instead, Kant
holds an action to be good if it is undertaken with a good will – that is, with the intent to
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perform the proper action in accordance with prior universal, rational principles. 96 For
Kant, these rational principles are the sole criteria by which our actions should be
measured. Kant’s fundamental guiding principle is the categorical imperative, the moral
proposition which advises us to “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.” 97 Subsequent to this claim, Kant also
holds that our moral obligation to the categorical imperative is distinct from our
volitional obligation to hypothetical imperatives, which impel us to act toward the
fulfillment of some contingent needs or desires; the categorical imperative constitutes a
moral obligation toward a good which is good in and for itself only. 98 For Kant,
everything we need to know about our moral obligations can be determined as necessity,
owing to a shared human nature in the form of universal structures of consciousness —
the capacity to reason the same way in response to a full range of moral challenges. 99
Kant’s moral philosophy faces a variety of obstacles. Here I will focus on some of the
most relevant formal challenges to Kant’s ethics that Nietzsche employs. While Kant is
not the only foundationalist which falls under the threat of Nietzsche’s criticism, his
influence on post-enlightenment morality cannot be understated, nor can his culpability
as an architect of MPS.
The moral necessity of the categorical imperative is based upon the problematic
assumption that our capacity of reason is robust enough to interpret universal truths at a
fundamental level, and to do so in such a way as to exhaust any contingency that his
ethics may encounter. Faith in Kant’s categorical imperative entails the belief that we
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should be able to recognize the good in establishing a particular action as a moral
obligation in every possible situation. Any exception would be enough to frustrate our
intention to will that some action should be prescribed as a universal law. However,
Nietzsche convincingly argues that we should be mistrustful of the proposition that
human reason and the world are so conveniently compatible. 100 We face the likelihood
that our inquiries cannot fully reveal the most fundamental truths of existence, nor even
determine whether such truths exist. There may always be aspects of human experience
that originate with conditions which are inaccessible to our understanding. Ethics can
only ever anticipate a partial perspective of this experience. Even if we were to accept
that moral good consists in acting from a good will, we can never derive maxims by
which to prescribe actions to be universal duties if our knowledge of the world, and even
ourselves, is necessarily incomplete or flawed. In other words, Kant’s view entails faith
in sets of claims that are too strong for the foundations that support them.
Owing to necessary limitations in individual outlooks, any moral account that we
may provide is necessarily “provincial”, grounded in an incomplete objective picture of
the totality of particular subjective human experiences. This premise is damaging for the
case of an action-guiding categorical imperative which appeals to rational universal
principles that we believe to be deducible a priori, and designate as binding to every
human being by virtue of a shared rational capacity to reason along these same lines.
Unfortunately, social structures and their foundational ideologies are too often the
basis of such rigid maxims that resist the acknowledgment of exception and cannot adjust
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when confronted by it. For Kant, for an action to be ethically prescribed means that it
must always be so, regardless of contingent circumstances which may affect the outcome
for good or bad. The admission of exceptional cases would invalidate the necessity of the
entire structure; ethical concepts are not universal if they inform human beings what to do
in almost all cases. Yet it is the very possibility of contingent exceptions that highlight
the efficacy of Nietzsche’s criticism of universal systems.
The world as a metaphysical ground – the “thing-in-itself” reality – is simply not
an accessible part of our experience, and so we have no way of dismissing the possibility
of exceptions, or of inconsistency in individual particular experiences. Even within the
range of those experiences, exceptions to what is conventionally absorbed into the
conception of the universal are likely substantially more prevalent than Kant’s absolutist
ethics allows.
Nietzsche observes that even if we could claim that particular practices were
demonstrably ethically justified in some contexts, this does not establish their necessity in
all similar circumstances, nor does it establish that we could ever anticipate every
contingent circumstance that might affect our ethical judgments under those specific
conditions. This is because the similarity between these separate events is likely only
superficial. 101 Not only are distinct events unique and subject to their own evaluative
conditions, but they may also reflect a multiplicity of overlapping or conflicting moral
commitments. In other words, we cannot proceed with certainty from knowing the
rightness of one action to knowing the rightness of another action which we deem to be
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similar. We may apply our experience of precedence in making moral determinations, but
in doing so we must accept that the similarity of precedent circumstances is only
conventional and lacks the necessity that would be required to ground a universal rule
such as the categorical imperative.
For Nietzsche then, a more effective and accurate moral perspective would
somehow accommodate the dynamic and often discordant nature of our experiences –
even those that bear some surface level of similarity – in order to be more useful to us. In
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche presents an analogy of the variability of our moral
commitments as planets whose orbits are determined at different positions by different
stars in their proximity. Under different circumstances, the same action may be evaluated
differently. 102 Aristotle reaches a similar conclusion when he equates the flexible norms
associated with justice to the malleable rule employed by builders in measuring stone. 103
In much the same way that a more rigid measuring device would result in an inaccurate
measure of the stone's contours, any measure of moral value which does not bend to
accommodate the imprecision of human life will fail to provide any useful normative
instruction. It is therefore not a flaw in ethical principles if they must evolve to adapt to
the particularity of new circumstances. For example, under many moral systems, to tell a
lie with the intent of preserving the life of another rather obviously carries a different
kind of moral obligation than to lie with the intent of advancing one’s own material
interests. Moreover, in many cases, the value of actions is contingent on the way that
intention and outcomes are linked together. Whereas Kant wants to bypass the
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contingency of outcomes (which can never be anticipated with necessity), the
prioritization of intention may lead us to cases in which this prescription of universality is
arbitrary or ineffective.
A system of universal rules can never adequately map the dynamic nature of
human existence and must rely upon the unsupportable presumption of regularity and
predictability in order to hold any normative efficacy. We should therefore approach
static ethical systems with skepticism, insofar as they do not reflect the world that they
presume in a realistic way. But if there can be no identity between two events and each is
in fact distinct in its particularity, then the “top-down” application of universal actionguiding principles is only grounded in an approximation of the way things are, and not a
necessity. Even more problematically, the quantification of a normalized conception of
the universal often falls under the power of social institutions that exploit this power to
express the aims of their own agenda.
However, there is another problem. To discontinue reliance on universals leads to
a further problem. If ethical norms are not grounded by any supervening principles which
are necessary and universal, then they are susceptible to the criticism that their
prescriptive power is weak or trivial — far from useful as the universal maxims that Kant
intends. In response to this criticism, it is important to note that there is a range of
normalized principles, approximating the function of universals, which still serve us in a
practical way, even when their grounding falls short of the universality they presume. We
in fact do rely upon the similarity of distinct events to render an approximation of the
world which is valuable to our everyday process of moral reasoning. Judith Butler argues
that the overall usefulness of our ethical systems is complicated by the fact that our
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formulation of them remains necessarily incomplete, but this does not render them
necessarily useless. 104 We can only employ ethical theories which institute our most
complete available approximations of what would ground our guiding principles, were
we to ever discover them. As such, our ideas of right and wrong, and our judgments of
value relating to these principles, are susceptible to ongoing revision, as they grow closer
to actualizing better and more effective formulations of moral concepts. Ethical norms
may evolve through refinements in application, and through adjustment to particular
circumstances. Accordingly, when we evaluate our ethical commitments to unfamiliar
circumstances, we may make adjustments and subsequently decide whether we are
improving their normative efficacy in doing so. Through a repetition of this process, over
time we may come closer to actualizing a useful set of particular norms, while discarding
others along the way. The fallibility of a necessarily limited “perspectival” existence
means that testing particular moral beliefs against those of others is a way of maximizing
their reliability, to the extent that we are capable of doing so.
Normalized behaviors help us to develop and refine existential narratives. Ideally,
retaining norms means that we have tested them against discourse which has reinforced
their reliability over narratives which were not as resilient under such scrutiny. Kwasi
Wiredu argues that shared rational discourse helps to make our beliefs and arguments
more resilient to skepticism. 105 If there is a shared medium by which beliefs are
communicated and evaluated against one another, then there is an improved chance that
we can avoid committing ourselves to practices which presume an unreliable grounding.
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Acknowledging that all knowledge claims are necessarily limited by perspective, the
strategy of taking a larger range of perspectives into account amounts to casting a wider
epistemic net. However, Wiredu’s argument is itself limited by his presupposition of a
“normal” cognitive range of human rationality which serves as the objective medium for
shared discourse. Even ignoring the problem that this argument is still vulnerable to the
same challenges of the skepticism he confronts, Wiredu’s claim does not allow for
significant deviations from a common biological mode of cognition. 106 Similar to the
earlier critique of Kant, Wiredu’s biological essentialism amounts to quantifying a
limited range of types and reifying them as if they are objectively grounded.
Nevertheless, Wiredu is correct that we cannot discount the importance of insights gained
through discourse, contingent or otherwise, as without them, we could not evaluate the
continued usefulness of our opinions.
As skeptics, we can still function with the awareness that there is no necessary
relationship between a “world-as-such” and the structures through which we interpret it.
It is not a problem for us that any such relationship is only conventional. The world that
we quantify in language and in reasoning is only ever an approximation aggregated
through a vastly elaborate system of metaphors which we may only ever communicate to
one another approximately. 107 This is necessary because we must adduce a similarity
between unquantifiable multitudes of disparate particular experiences in order to
understand them, and more importantly, to make them meaningful. We create meaning
by imposing these relationships between phenomena. If one particular experience
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acquires a meaning for us, another experience is potentially intelligible by invoking the
similarity it has to that original experience. However, recall Nietzsche’s criticism of
Kant’s imposition of identity where only similarity may exist. 108 The dilemma Western
epistemology cannot rid itself of is that it sets a criterion for knowledge which can never
be achieved, and yet knowledge claims within the tradition are no less ubiquitous for the
effort. But we do not need a priori, necessarily grounded truths to function; we need to
create meaning. We can do this by approaching customary relationships between actions
and outcomes and determining some to be valuable.
As Aristotle claims, “The rule for what is indefinite is itself indefinite.” 109
Accordingly, when we apply our customary habits and interpretations to new sets of
circumstances and find them wanting, the improper response is to cling to them resolutely
out of deference to familiar “necessary” systems. Kantian ethics is unequivocally
opposed to this kind of revision in the face of contravening evidence. The categorical
imperative resists revision because it is instituted as if it already infallibly encompasses a
complete range of moral criteria. In practice, if inconsistency arises, that which does not
fit systemic categorization is often simply ignored or discarded. Societal structures assert
a monopoly over value categories by claiming a necessary affiliation with the universal,
and every particular that falls outside of categorization is presumed to be flawed,
incomplete, other. 110 But when we structure our categories in such a way that they intend
the universal, they become removed from experience – they become something abstract,
transcendent.
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Herein lies the problem with ethical systems. We may always be confronted with
particularity which falls drastically outside of that to which accepted norms are capable
of prescribing a response, and to which previous experience can provide any reliable
guide. For us, the world consists of an unpredictable array of conditions which may
challenge the necessity of our moral claims. The problem therefore lies in determining
whether we can conceive of a binding ethics which admits the possibility of revision, and
honestly acknowledges the nuances and irregularities of human experience. Ultimately,
as Nietzsche observes, no system has proven itself conclusively more reliable than any
other, and so we are better off cutting ourselves free of ethical maxims as monolithic
standards of value. 111
As I have mentioned, drawing a distinction between morality in the pejorative
sense (MPS), and morality itself is important. Nietzsche’s attack on the “transcendental”
metaphysics which grounds universal structures does not extend to preclude the
possibility of normative moral arguments, though they obviously must take different
forms than the conventional models that he attacks. The solution to this disparity lies in
distinguishing principles from structures. Robert Solomon outlines terminology which
helps to clarify the distinction. Solomon identifies “morality” with those universal
systems of norms that Nietzsche explicitly rejects, and “morals” as “generally agreeable
or acceptable traits that characterize a good person.” 112 For Solomon, a further distinction
is made between these terms and “ethics,” which refers to the broad field of discourse
involving questions of morality and morals, and the relationships between. Solomon
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observes that for Nietzsche, the primary ethical question has to do with what the
relationship between morals and morality actually is. 113 The question is whether in the
extra-moral phase which Nietzsche urges us toward, we will still have something that
resembles morals. Solomon concludes that the post-moral Nietzschean morals, however
we articulate them in terms of their content, are best understood as analogous to those of
Aristotle, and antithetical to those of Kant. 114 Aristotle offers us a blueprint for forging
value norms in the face of the dynamic, contingent, and often inconsistent world –
virtues. Virtue as a moral concept provides a way to understand Nietzsche’s
transcendence of the moral phase, and his elevation of a moral criterion that is
unintentional.
2.3 Ethics and Agency – A Move Toward the “Unintentional”
Even as Nietzsche reflects on the presumed advantage of the historical shift
toward intention-based prescriptive ethics in his figurative genealogy, he already
persuades us that a further move is warranted: a progression beyond intention as the
criterion of moral value. Acknowledging that we routinely judge actions based upon what
we presume to be the causal conditions of agency, Nietzsche claims that our
identification of intention as the cause of our actions is inadequate – that the true cause
lies in what is unintentional in the act. 115 This claim is less paradoxical than it may seem.
Any prescription that we act with a “good intent” requires meaningful knowledge about
agents and their intentions. Under conventional models of the moral phase, an agent wills
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an action, and we subject the content of this “willing” to moral scrutiny. However, as
Nietzsche consistently argues, we have no reliable access to the internal structures of
consciousness which moralists claim to ground our knowledge, and which would allow
us to presuppose ethical maxims a priori.116 Investigation into these causal mechanisms
leads us to a regress of hidden motivations, impulses, and other factors which are likely
obscured to us. 117 In other words, either there appears to be something in the causal
sequence underlying agency which is prior to that which we commonly accept as its
ground, or we are mistaken in believing that we can identify the reasons we act in any
such way at all. Either way, that which we take to be “conscious reasoning” in the
constitution of agency is not a stable ground for moral criteria.
It is ambitious to question something as fundamental as the supposition of an “I”
that oversees all of our actions — the identity of self with agent, and agency with the
process of willing, under the direction of conscious intention. But as Nietzsche points out,
this impression we have which casts the agent as cause and the action as its effect
requires an oversimplification of phenomena in order to fulfill this purpose. 118 In The
Gay Science, Nietzsche elaborates how we typically conceive of the role of the will in a
presumably intentional action, such as striking an object:
[…]the feeling of will seems sufficient to him not only for the
assumption of cause and effect but also for the faith that he
understands their relationship. He knows nothing of the mechanism of
what happened and of the hundredfold fine work that needs to be done
to bring about the strike, or of the incapacity of the will in itself to do
even the tiniest part of the work.
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As we see in this passage, according to Nietzsche, the simple view of will and
agency is reinforced by some feeling we come to associate with the act of striking, and
these affective phenomena belie the fact that the processes involved may actually be
more complex than we take them to be. Commonly, we conceive of the will in a very
linear way; we will actions, and they subsequently occur, and so we reasonably conclude
that we have directed the whole process. But conventional understandings of agency also
allow that this may work the opposite way as well — sometimes we speak of the will as
something which overtakes us and impels us to act. If we can be affected by the will in
this way, then we are not identical to the will, nor are we even necessarily its architect
and overseer. So then what exactly is the will and what is our relationship to it? If that
which we take to be the will has some sway over our actions independently of our
conscious intent, then somehow, we are beings that both will action and are willed to act.
Brian Leiter observes that Nietzsche’s arguments about agency address the fundamental
question of why we tend to identify ourselves with the phenomena which control the will
to act, rather than those which are controlled by it. 119 In his discussion on the nature of
the will in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche explains:
“Freedom of Will”— that is the expression for the complex state of delight of the
person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself
with the executor of the order — who, as such, enjoys also the triumph over
obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his own will that overcame
them. 120
We generally have little problem accepting that some of our bodily activity is the
result of unconscious drives or impulses. What is more difficult for us to accept is that
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these same kinds of internal or unconscious phenomena may be causally intertwined with
what we take to be our agential activities — our deliberate intentions to carry out actions
in fulfillment of our goals. The reason, according to Nietzsche, is that it feels better to
conceive of ourselves as being in control of these phenomena than being controlled by
them. Because we are the kinds of beings Nietzsche claims that we are, this “emotion of
supremacy” that we come to associate with agency is a state that we enjoy — we thrive
on the feeling of power. 121 The preference for this state leads us to exaggerate the fiction
of the I — the doer that precedes the deed. However, our preference for being in control
is not sufficient to make it so. Our distortion of this phenomenon leads to the strange
“doubling” effect discussed above — a branching of a single event into two: doer and
deed.
Unconscious impulses and drives to act may be no less integral to the process of
agency than our conscious faculties of reason. In fact, many more of these impulses and
drives may be constitutive of agency than we apprehend or acknowledge, accounting for
the obscure “hundredfold fine work” to which Nietzsche refers. Even those conscious
thoughts which we take to motivate our intentional actions are in turn motivated by a
multitude of unconscious mechanisms. 122 Patterns of actions, behaviors, character traits
— in fact, principle truths about who we are — emerge from a set configuration of
various unconscious drives and their relation to one another. 123 Leiter refers to this as the
“Doctrine of Types,” and argues that while Nietzsche recognizes a wide range in
variability in the way that these “type facts” manifest in different individuals, they
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represent a kind of nature which is relatively fixed. 124 Accompanying the expression of
our unconscious drives is the conscious affect of willing, a feeling which, according to
Leiter, Nietzsche holds to be epiphenomenal. 125
Obviously, dismantling the conventional distinction of self and agency has
deterministic implications which threaten to render any moral prescriptions or judgments
meaningless. 126 It follows from this model that acts that we may judge as volitional, and
therefore susceptible to moral approval or reproach, would instead merely be the
culmination of drives and impulses leading us to the moment of action — each instance
of such being a symptom of our nature (type facts) rather than a deliberate choice. Even
assuming specific kinds of actions to be more valuable than others, it is unusual to
present values in moral terms if technically speaking, we are not “free” to accept or reject
directives based on them. We might be tempted to abandon ethical interpretations and
simply accept that a kind of determinism follows from Nietzsche’s critique of agency.
However, Nietzsche makes clear that he is not engaged in the wholesale rejection of
moral value itself, but its widely-accepted foundations, in the hope that he may establish
more useful and enduring forms of morality, or at least lay the groundwork for a future
discourse in which morality will be untethered to those foundations. 127 Nietzsche’s new
moral grounding will face the ambitious task of reconciling the possibility of moral
responsibility with two truths about agency that conventional morality fails to
acknowledge: 1) agency is a specific kind of phenomenon with causal origins misplaced
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from where we commonly think them to exist (i.e., in our conscious faculties of
deliberation) and 2) actions are the consequence of some kind of fixed disposition,
variably instantiated across different types of individuals.
Moral beliefs are necessarily normative, in that the overall moral system in which
the beliefs participate presumes some actions to be right and others to be wrong. This is
true whether we follow the rules or not; if we subscribe to a moral view, then we accept
some standards by which our actions are evaluated, and implicit pressures toward actions
of particular kinds. These conditions are present in Nietzsche’s moral philosophy even
though his accounts of agency appear to allow little room for personal moral
responsibility by conventional standards. For Nietzsche, normativity is a natural
consequence of agency itself. This bears further explanation.
Given the inscrutability of the processes that drive our actions, under what
conditions can we claim to have actual agency (a minimal sufficient condition for moral
responsibility)? Nietzsche’s concern is that when we consider the unconscious
mechanisms and drives involved, much of what we take to be “active” in agency is
actually passive, to some significant degree. Still, in order to make moral judgments, we
must be able to make some distinction between activity and passivity in our actions.
According to Paul Katsafanas, to begin with, we can distinguish active agency as actions
performed in a state of equilibrium; in other words, agential actions are those that an
agent approves of, with the condition that this approval would not be affected by any
additional information concerning the actual cause of those actions. To put it another
way, if we were to learn upon further review that our reasons for acting are not what we
took them to be, but instead the result of hidden drives or undisclosed motives that are at
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odds with our reasoning, then we would not consider our role in acting to be active. 128
This condition accounts for the possibility of circumstances in which we may be wrong
about our presumed motivations for acting. The example that Katsafanas introduces is
that of an anorexic patient, who deems it completely rational to avoid eating, but would
likely not feel the same way about this justification were their decisions not influenced by
the disorder. 129 This example represents (from the outside at least) a rather obvious case
of disequilibrium, but we must remember that Nietzsche has consistently argued that
much more of the reasoning grounding our active agency than we realize lacks the
criterion of equilibrium.
Introspection into our motivations is the first step in determining if we are in a
state of equilibrium, but there is a complication; we may not know if our introspective
conclusions are themselves in disequilibrium. 130 To continue to dissect the layers of
background motives in this way appears to only lead us into a regress. Actually, this is
not necessarily the case. As Katsafanas points out, while the actual drives and
motivations in question are technically out of the range of our introspection, we must
remember that all such considerations are available to us in abstraction, as counter-factual
models of agents and actions. 131 Once again, remember that this is Nietzsche’s domain of
moral discourse — thought experiments which highlight the neglected corners of human
psychology. While it is true that we may never reach that bedrock of causal priority,
through counter-factuals, we can assess the conditions which would lead an individual to
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be in a state of disequilibrium, and then provisionally compare these conditions to our
own presumed motives. The anticipation of “additional information” that could change
our approval of our actions is an additional hypothetical safeguard against disequilibrium.
The concept of equilibrium provides a more precise means to distinguish between
active and passive acts, thus satisfying our minimal condition for personal moral
responsibility, but further steps are required in order to develop moral claims concerning
what kinds of acts we should approve of, and why. According to Katsafanas, action has
what he refers to as constitutive aims. We have seen that the first of these constitutive
aims is equilibrium; in order for our actions to qualify as action at all, we must approve of
our actions. The second of these constitutive aims is the will to power. 132 The will to
power is that principal drive by which all beings are motivated to pursue and overcome
resistances — a drive which, according to Nietzsche, is all too often constrained in
conventional Western moral systems. 133
2.4 Exemplars and the “Normative” Value of Will to Power
If, as Katsafanas claims, the will to power is a constitutive aim, it endows actions
with a kind of “built-in” normative value. While there are always concealed and
indeterminate drives motivating actions — often in conflict with one another — we can
reliably assume the most primary of these to be the agent’s will to power. In addition to
clarifying questions of motivation, we can, as Nietzsche consistently does, employ our
understanding of this drive as a standard of moral evaluation, with a few caveats. Will to
power can function as a normative principle because for agents, as a drive which is prior
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to all other drives, there is value in performing actions that successfully and consistently
satisfy it. We might say that insofar as we approve of acting at all, we should perform
actions which express the will to power. 134 To summarize the normative argument on
Nietzsche’s model of agency: 1) we are fundamentally constituted in such a way as to
primarily will power, 2) because of this constitution of the will, and the way that the will
to power is expressed, we are beings that generally thrive in circumstances that allow for
the effective expression of the will to power through meeting and overcoming
resistances, and because of these two claims, 3) action is valuable to the degree that it
succeeds at its aim of willing power (by meeting and overcoming challenges). Similar to
Kant’s strategy in formulating the Categorical Imperative, Nietzsche has determined the
Will to Power as a universal ground to agency, though one which is more resilient to his
critiques, based upon what is actually accessible to our investigation – our actions.
Because of Nietzsche’s particular view of power as the principle constitutive aim
of our drives, and because of the way that the affect associated with the will to power is
generated, we might think that we have an ironclad response to Silenus’ warning of a
human existence which is maximally and inescapably challenging. This is true to a
certain extent, in that the level of possible resistances which such an existence provides is
presumed to be inexhaustible. In other words, a life of suffering is a dynamic and
unending flow of resistances for us to confront. However, the will to power is expressed
in overcoming resistances, rather than being perpetually overcome by them. 135 We
experience the affect associated with the will to power when we meet resistance and
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overcome it, but to be constantly thwarted by resistances which we cannot overcome does
not give us this feeling; instead, we feel the negative affect of being under the control of
pressures beyond the boundaries of our will. 136 The ability to meet and overcome
challenges and therefore successfully express the will to power varies according to the
capacities of the individual, and so does the level to which the pessimistic view of Silenus
can be embraced authentically, independently of the Apollonian veil of placating
existential narratives.
Nietzsche’s account of Silenus embodies the most challenging form of the
pessimism which any life-affirming philosophy must confront: life is inherently without
meaning or value, and suffering is inevitable. This view aligns with one which is heavily
influential to Nietzsche’s own — that of Schopenhauer — though the two philosophers
arrive at significantly different conclusions about how we should act under these
conditions. The mythical Silenus very clearly argues that there are only two possible
responses to our conditions of existence: antinatalism and suicide, and the first of these is
already unavailable to us. Nietzsche introduces the Silenus myth to represent a third
option: avoidance of the inescapable and harmful truth — better perhaps that Midas had
never demanded to uncover it in the first place. But assuming that this Pandora’s box is
now already opened, how may we successfully distract ourselves from the truth?
According to Schopenhauer, through artistic representation, we are afforded a
kind of necessary but temporary “escape” from our immersion in this unending
experience of adversity. 137 But Nietzsche offers a further pair of alternatives to the
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challenge of Silenus. While Nietzsche shares Schopenhauer’s acceptance of the ubiquity
of suffering, he diverges from Schopenhauer’s prescription of the will’s response to it. 138
For Nietzsche, the value of tragedy is not that our attention to and engagement with the
world is diverted by a beautiful representation, but that an honest representation will
illuminate or emphasize the actual beauty of an existence rife with suffering and tragedy.
For those individuals who have developed the capacity to face the challenges that such a
life represents, the experience of perpetual hardship constitutes an ongoing source of
potential resistances to overcome. Alternately, for those who lack this capacity to such a
degree, tempering the Dionysian truths in Apollonian narratives allows for intermediary
stages of resistance and overcoming. 139 This is not the same course as the diversion
Schopenhauer’s aesthetic offers; for Nietzsche, life does not merely inspire art as a
distraction, but life becomes art, whatever perspective we adopt as its voice. 140
Nietzsche’s model of the constitutive aims of agency as the ground of value raises
a troubling concern: while the will to power must express itself through perpetually
meeting and overcoming resistance, this model does not distinguish a particular type of
overcoming, opening the door to valuing behavior which we may determine to be
egoistic, cruel, and even tyrannical by what we presume to be any reasonable standards.
In fact, we find that Nietzsche often explicitly praises and defends these properties of
character. 141 However, Katsafanas points out that while willing power is valuable to us
because it is constitutive of agency, and the successful expression of power is valuable on
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this basis alone, it is not the only value by which we judge our actions. 142 The drive to
express power may cohere within a framework of other values which include drives
toward selfishness and cruelty. It is important to understand that Nietzsche does not
praise these values except in relation to their extrinsic value in facilitating our successful
expression of the will to power.
Much of Nietzsche’s praise of cruelty as cultural practice is presented in one of
two ways: either as reflection on what we might refer to as the bygone nobility of more
violent cultures of the past, or as affirmation of the free expression of a component of
human nature that we may attempt to sublimate but can never fully overcome. 143 When
Nietzsche urges us to consider the value of cruelty, he observes that whatever we may
make of it, we feel powerful when we are cruel toward another. Such instances of cruelty
also offer opportunities for those enduring torment to will power through resisting and
overcoming their torment. 144 Similarly, there is some benefit in cruelty which is selfdirected — to willfully place oneself into the path of suffering which could otherwise
have been avoided in order to meet a greater range of challenges. 145 These occasions for
constructive cruelty stand in contrast with a kind of cruelty Nietzsche criticizes, which is
the way that forms of modern culture inflict cruelty on individuals by limiting their
potential to successfully will power. 146 Suffering for its own sake has no intrinsic value,
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and this includes the infliction of suffering with no associated possibility of overcoming,
such as that imposed by the ascetic, or other “life-denying” philosophies. 147
When Nietzsche urges us to reconsider our accustomed rejection of selfishness,
barbarity, and cruelty, it is because these values represent one effective pathway to
fulfilling the primary constitutive aim of our actions — power. However, there are others
which are better suited to the conditions of our existence. Even though there is extrinsic
value in suffering, there is nothing to be gained by intentionally creating more suffering
for others, as life provides ample opportunities for suffering already. It is improbable that
we can completely discount the extrinsic value of suffering, but we can understand that in
the long run, it may lead to greater internal conflict among our other values and drives,
thus actually interfering with the successful expression of the will to power. It is
preferable to seek out resistances through self-cultivation and creativity, and in this way
eliminate, or at least minimize any internal conflict between our various drives and
values. Katsafanas notes that the exemplars Nietzsche holds in the highest regard are not
the violent tyrants engaged in cruel subjugation over others, but artists and intellectuals,
willing power by setting their energies upon creative tasks. 148 This is reasonable if we
consider Nietzsche’s encouragement for us to live a kind of life that is valuable on
primarily aesthetic terms. Whatever forms such existence may take, because of the
priority of the aesthetic, it makes sense that artists would occupy a privileged status in
Nietzsche’s articulation of exemplar narratives.
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2.5 Defining a Nietzschean Model of Virtue
Because the will to power motivates all of our actions, we have a reason to
resolve conflicting values which might restrict or inhibit the success of actions which
most effectively express power. Agency consists of an aggregate of processes and drives
infinitely more complex than we can ever discern in their totality, so it is unlikely that we
can ever completely eliminate internal conflict, but we can take steps to minimize it. For
Nietzsche, the worst kind of internal conflict arises when we adopt values which express
themselves in ways which fundamentally conflict with the will to power. While the will
to power is a necessary, immutable feature of agency, presumably, we have some control
over how we develop other values. Nietzsche’s moral philosophy amounts to a reexamination of the value of our values, with power as the standard by which we conduct
this undertaking. 149 This strategy is crucial, because through the course of things we may
adopt or enculturate values which impede the will to power, and thereby worsen the
internal conflict of our drives. As Katsafanas’ argues, simply by virtue of these facts
about the nature of agency, power functions as a prescriptive criterion.
At first glance, the course corrections that Nietzsche prescribes may seem like a
simple series of choices to change behavior in order to produce the kinds of actions that
cohere best with the will to power. The problem with this, as Leiter suggests, returns us
to the questionable presumption of the identity of self and agency. We think that we intuit
a situation which calls for us to will a correction in our behavior, and then subsequently
this correction takes place in accord with the causal influence of the will. However,
according to Leiter, for Nietzsche, this relationship is only epiphenomenal; the
149
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disposition to enact specific actions — including those which constitute amendments of
prior dispositions and actions — are actually only a result of stable “type facts” over
which we have no actual control. 150 In the same way that sets of inscrutable drives
motivate actions, others may motivate changes in those actions, independently of our
perceived decision to make adjustments in accordance with any moral criteria. According
to Leiter, “A 'person' is an arena in which the struggle of drives (type-facts) is played out;
how they play out determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes.” 151
This means that while there may be a moral prescription that we endorse in equilibrium,
whether we follow this prescription or not is in no way a result of our conscious willing,
but the outcome of a “contest” of deterministic impulses.
If this is the case, can we actually change our values? Or is the capacity to change
them already a fixed element in our nature — a disposition to self-cultivate, to realize a
certain kind of self? At times, Nietzsche does appear to hold an entirely deterministic
view of agency. 152 This is problematic because determinism is fundamentally
incompatible with the idea of moral responsibility. However, once again we face the
challenge of reconciling these apparently deterministic views with those which explicitly
prescribe self-cultivation and which appear to acknowledge the possibility that our drives
can in fact change. 153 A belief in the possibility of self-cultivation entails the idea that not
only can we change and evolve, but that we have some influence over this change, and
are able to affect the course of events that determine what kind of person we become. The
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reason that these views do not stand in contradiction is that Nietzsche is not a skeptic
with regards to the possibility of agency and self-cultivation, but with regards to
something more basic — our conventional understanding of causation. 154 In the case of
agency, the error occurs when we presume that we cause our actions through a
consciously directed effort of will.
It may not be clear how this distinction avoids the complications of determinism.
Recall that in the “extra-moral” phase, Nietzsche directs us to abandon intention as the
criterion of value, and instead concern ourselves with what is unintentional in the act. 155
If we are mistaken in ascribing causal efficacy to the phenomena of intention, then it
makes sense that Nietzsche would advise us to detach ourselves from this error. It is more
difficult to understand what Nietzsche actually means in prioritizing the unintentional.
Aaron Ridley interprets this passage to mean that the “causal” will and subsequent action
are not known to us as discrete phenomena, but are merely conventional differentiations
of a single “mutually constitutive” event — the act itself. 156 In On the Genealogy of
Morals, Nietzsche explains: “[...]there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming;
“the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything.” 157 In more
general terms, it makes no sense to speak of a cause without an effect and so a will
without an action has not actually willed anything. Willing is an event which comes into
our awareness only at the time that the “willed” action occurs. If, as Leiter concludes, the
association between willing and action is epiphenomenal, this may account for the
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proposition that inaccessible “type facts” lead us to act in specific ways. 158 However, if
the relationship between the will and action is only epiphenomenal, then how do we have
any influence over the type facts which are the true causes of our actions, as Nietzsche’s
(and in fact, any) moral prescriptions would require? How can we effect a legitimate
moral change on our underlying properties of character such that we may create
consistent patterns of responses to moral challenges? In other words, we appear to have
circled back on skepticism about the possibility of agency.
The set of type facts that dictate our actions are what Lester Hunt refers to as our
“deep character.” In order to change our actions, we would require the ability to adjust
either the deep character which leads to our actions, or the actions themselves. Hunt
reasons that the first option is impossible, and the second is “not ethically relevant,” as it
represents a surface-level conformity which is only practical, rather than a true
modification of individual moral properties. 159 There is very often a “practical”
concurrence between actions and what we take to be the intentions that motivate them. If
this were not the case, then we would likely find it difficult to make judgments about
whether our actions were undertaken in equilibrium. The problem is that our only access
to deep character is not “deep” within the hidden psychology of the agent, but outward, in
actions. 160 So if we accept the idea of one-way causality between deep character and
surface behavior, then morally relevant change is simply not possible.
However, Nietzsche does believe in the possibility of our behavior influencing
changes in the drives which comprise deep character. In Daybreak, he outlines specific
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ways by which we can habituate responses through repetitive actions, and in this way
weaken, or even altogether eliminate the influence of drives over our actions. 161 This
model demonstrates clear parallels to the mechanism of moral development under
classical virtue ethics. To clarify, Aristotle believes that we are capable of developing
moral virtues through the repetition of specific kinds of actions in specific circumstances,
and that these actions come to us more naturally in what we determine to be similar
circumstances. 162 Some actions may become a kinds of default responses, as habituated
expressions of an agent’s character, or deep character (drives and impulses). Once such a
characteristic has been sufficiently cultivated, one may reach a state in which the
individual is not in conscious negotiation of each action in order to cultivate or maintain
the desired kind of conduct. Instead, good action “flows” from a good kind of character,
and eventually, becomes internalized as a disposition of that character. 163 If an individual
has conditioned themselves toward certain patterns of behavior, then there is some
component of the new behavior which is generated by the disposition toward that kind of
action, and not the “surface” decision to act a certain way. This provides reasonable
justification for the claim that, in some sense at least, a virtue is a point of convergence
between doer and deed, rather than a presumption of the former as the “substratum” for
the latter, which would entail unsound metaphysical speculation. 164 In other words, the
expression of a virtue is an event in which a specific kind of character performs a specific
kind of action. If the agent lacks the disposition toward this virtue, they still may hold the
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capacity for its development, through manipulation of the mechanisms that comprise
deep character.
Virtue functions as a more stable causal grounding for morality than intention
because it does not look to the inscrutable “why” of an action, but to the indisputable
“what” in its expression. When Nietzsche collapses agency into action, it suggests that
action consistently arises dispositions, the cumulative result of drives which comprise
deep character. While we have no direct access to the components of deep character, the
important moral part of a virtue is in its expression, in what is accessible to us — the
deed. Virtue ethics works in this way because drives are dispositional, not volitional.
They are events in which specific kinds of characters perform specific kinds of actions.
The standard of good action is then the act undertaken by a good agent – what we would
refer to as an exemplar. From outward knowledge of an agent’s patterns of behavior, we
may derive indicators of habituated dispositions toward certain kinds of actions (virtues
or vices). We see no “doer behind the deed,” but a doer in the deed. Contingent upon
what traits of character we value, we develop standards of the exemplar type — the
individual who appears to have internalized a broad range of virtuous dispositions, which
we observe as an overall stable tendency to demonstrate valued behaviors in practice.
In virtue ethics then, the prescriptive component of good action is not determined
by rigidly normalized sets of rules and principles, but through the emulation of worthy
ideals. These ideals are actions which reflect the virtuous character of exemplars. 165 This
standard of the good comes to represent a flexible body of value norms, as what is
considered a virtuous character is contingent upon the shifting values of individuals and
165
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groups. For both Nietzsche and Aristotle this flexibility is a fundamental feature of sound
ethical commitments. Virtues are not universal maxims but are customs which evolve
through refinements in a culture’s moral reasoning, and its attunement to the particularity
of circumstances which merit the intervention of this reasoning.
2.6 In Defense of the Virtue Theory Interpretation
If virtue ethics functions in the way that I have defended, it can accommodate the
necessarily shifting and contingent nature of viable value sets in relation to the dynamic
background conditions of our existence, and account for the problem of agency through
the reorientation of value criteria into actions themselves. These features align with
Nietzsche’s ethical comments, but there are also differences between most familiar forms
of virtue ethics and many of the values that Nietzsche embraces. As I have argued, in
order to adequately defend Nietzsche as a virtue theorist, some additional distinctions
must be established in order to account for notable differences between Nietzsche’s
specific virtues and those of our most familiar counterpart – in this case, the virtues of
classical eudaemonist ethics.
We may anticipate the objection that the virtue theory interpretation of
Nietzsche’s ethics fails on the grounds that the resemblances to the familiar Aristotelian
model are cosmetic at best, and that there is nothing in Nietzsche’s work that resembles
what can be called a virtue without straining the concept beyond conceptual coherence.
One such critic, Jessica Berry, argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy fails to meet
reasonable criteria which would clearly establish Nietzsche as a virtue theorist. Berry
refers to the dual conditions outlined by Christine Swanton which state that any virtue
ethics must both identify what qualifies an action as “right,” and then identify what traits
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qualify as “virtues.” 166 According to Berry Nietzsche does not address either of these
conditions at any point in his writings, leading Swanton to exaggerate textual support for
the conclusion that Nietzsche is a kind of virtue theorist. 167 In the case of the first
condition, Berry claims that Swanton falsely attributes to Nietzsche an evaluation of the
goodness of action based upon virtuous intent. At issue is a problematic interpretation of
this passage from On the Genealogy of Morals: “The popular mind in fact doubles the
deed; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the deed of a deed...”. 168 Swanton appears to
argue that in this passage, Nietzsche maintains the distinction between doer and deed,
rather than rejects it. By this reasoning, action would be that which is “caused” by the
prior phenomenon of intention. The point of this interpretation is to then hold, in familiar
Kantian terms, the good intention as the moral criterion grounding the system of virtue. A
character which intends good action is an exemplar, by the standards of this
interpretation. If this is Swanton’s primary argument in support of a Nietzschean Virtue
Theory, it is defective, as it either overlooks or confuses Nietzsche’s skepticism of the
causal relationship between intention and action, as well as his disavowal of the moral
value of intention.
Berry responds to Swanton’s second criteria: that a virtue theory must establish
which traits are virtues. According to Berry, Nietzsche’s value claims do not function as
virtues, nor does he intend them to, and so the virtue theory interpretation fails on this
criterion as well. 169 Berry argues that virtue proponents such as Swanton have conflated
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Nietzsche’s argument for the transcendence of outmoded systems with an argument for
the advancement of a new system with which to replace them. There are problems with
both Berry’s and Swanton’s arguments. Berry’s criticism relies upon a constrained
definition of the concept of virtue in order to reject Nietzsche as a virtue theorist, while
Swanton’s argument appeals to a flawed interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of
agency. Though Berry succeeds at refuting Swanton’s initial argument on these grounds,
if it can be established that Nietzsche both provides an account of what he considers to be
good actions, and an account of what traits are successful at bringing about these good
actions, then on the criteria accepted by both Swanton and Berry, the pro-virtue theory
argument still succeeds.
Berry concedes that Nietzsche presents prescriptive arguments to the extent that
he encourages us to reach a point where we no longer require deference to systems that
guide our actions, but she stops short at accepting that the values he advances throughout
his writings can correctly be termed virtues. For Berry, the misguided urge to overstep
and attribute positive moral content to Nietzsche without corresponding textual support
overlooks what is most compelling about Nietzsche’s work: the success of the critiques
themselves. 170 It is true that Nietzsche’s work is philosophically significant even if he
only intends to dismantle foundations and does not replace them with his own moral
propositions. If this were the case, Nietzsche’s positive claims, his judgments, his praise
of humans who fulfill the kind of existential narratives that he juxtaposes with the targets
of his critiques, would all amount to kinds of literary exercises — ways to illustrate what
he disvalues in systemic structures by illustrating their antitheses. For one thing, it is
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unclear how this objection constitutes a necessary conceptual distinction, given
Nietzsche’s view of the relationship between art and life — a beautiful representation of
life can function as an implicit call to align one’s ways of living with the aesthetic ideal.
Further, in his rejection of conventional morality, Nietzsche often explicitly encourages
readers to cultivate the specific properties of character which would contribute to the
further “good” of extra-moral flourishing. Berry’s objection over referring to these
properties of character as virtues would require a somewhat narrow restriction on the
terminology.
There is a reason that the values which Nietzsche advances throughout his
writings bear striking differences from familiar formulations of virtue ethics. Given the
fundamental dissimilarity between Nietzsche’s worldview and those of other virtue
theorists, we should expect Nietzsche to endorse distinctly different kinds of virtues as
different responses to kinds of moral challenges. In clarifying this distinction, Robert
Solomon characterizes Aristotle’s virtues as a response to the warlike Homeric tradition
which preceded him, in which we derive the standard of good action by emulating the
behavior of “heroes.” 171 Nietzsche’s virtues, on the other hand, would reasonably emerge
as a response to a post-enlightenment world view, in which a general awareness that the
world is fundamentally incompatible with flourishing in the classical sense has grown
more salient. 172 Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the rupture between these virtue traditions
is more complicated than we may presume, and that this has had a far-reaching impact
upon the failures of contemporary ethics. MacIntyre views Nietzsche’s morality not as a
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repudiation of Aristotelian ethics, but as a response to the failure of the enlightenment
tradition which broke with Aristotelian ethics. 173 While Aristotle’s virtues remain fixed to
a “bygone” cultural context, MacIntyre argues that our values are still grounded in the
“ghosts” of Homeric and Aristotelian values. While MacIntyre ultimately believes
(incorrectly) that Nietzsche’s untethering of grounded value leads inevitably to
relativism, his argument prompts us to consider that if the departure of enlightenment
ethics had never taken place, would we still need to reject the Aristotelian virtue
tradition?
According to Nietzsche, the answer is yes. Nietzsche provides ample argument
that a rejection of traditional virtues is necessary beyond enlightenment ethical systems
(and their subsequent failures). According to Nietzsche, those virtues which we have
traditionally cultivated – those of diligence, obedience, chastity, piety, and justice – are
those which aim to preserve the interests of societal agenda at great harm to the
individual. 174 Nietzsche argues that our elevation of these values amounts to “…the
praise of drives which deprive a human being of his noblest selfishness and of the
strength for the highest form of self-protection.” In other words, these virtues conflict
with the will to power. Nietzsche explicitly warns of the “leveling” pressures of a society
which would effectively make us progressively more mediocre in the utilitarian interest
of maximizing the human good in the universal sense, and at the cost of abandoning what
is exceptional about humanity in its various particularity. 175
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Nietzsche’s rejection of these long-standing virtues does not constitute an attack
on the possibility of virtue itself, and he gives us some idea what kinds of virtues he
would have us adopt, and how these virtues function in relation to our other drives and
dispositions.176 Like more traditional conceptions of virtue, Nietzsche’s virtues reflect a
cultivated disposition to enact values. Nietzsche assigns provisional value to properties
which result in the transcendence of normalized systems, and those which reinforce the
disposition toward properties of character which weaken our reliance on “herd” values. In
other words, the move toward breaking out of the cycle of cultural conditioning is
facilitated by a different kind of virtue, and like any other virtue, it can be cultivated
under the right conditions, and through the right kind of practice.
What we can concede to Berry is that she has successfully refuted any argument
for Nietzsche supporting an “Aristotelian” form of virtue ethics in his writings, but this is
not the point that most proponents of a Nietzschean virtue ethic are advancing. Instead,
there is strong support for the argument that Nietzsche develops a model of value
formation which both emphasizes the active expression of some kinds of properly
developed character and intends some further “good” state of affairs for us, to the extent
that this is possible, given the circumstances to which we are bound. Value structures
which are primarily focused on maintaining social order and preserving the status quo
actually limit our capacity to achieve any sustainable level of flourishing. They do this in
two ways. First, by dismantling meaningful narratives by which we aesthetically mitigate
intolerable suffering, and second, by imposing new narratives of control, limiting our
potential to effectively meet and overcome resistances. A Nietzschean virtue would be a
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property associated with the unwillingness to confine oneself to systems of value, and our
values would be those of valuelessness, our system “system-lessness.” Nietzsche’s
standard of good value involves the achievement of circumstances in which we are not
bound to structures which harmfully inhibit our capacity to will power.
Both Christine Daigle and Mathew Dennis offer promising ways to flesh out
Swanton’s two requisite conditions of a virtue theory. 177 According to Christine Daigle,
in response to the first condition, Nietzsche’s specific virtues are those dispositions which
further one’s progress toward the ultimate transcendence of value structures. In response
to the second condition, these dispositions include those of creativity, individuality, free
thinking, and “trans-systemic” reasoning — in other words, the propensity to forge one’s
own existential narrative. 178 Mathew Dennis introduces his own subtle refinement to this
account. For Dennis, the “ethical ideal” which is the ultimate end of Nietzsche’s virtue
ethics is “becoming oneself,” and he articulates the specific Nietzschean virtues as those
which lead us to self-cultivation. 179 Once again, this conception of virtue is at odds with
predominant moral narratives, but following from the conditions of our existence and
necessary facts about agency, in Nietzsche’s virtues we see both an articulation of which
kinds of actions are valuable for us, and what kinds of character traits we should
cultivate. In other words, Nietzsche’s ethics satisfies the conditions of virtue ethics, on
criteria accepted by both Swanton and her critic Berry.
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2.7 Self-Cultivation, Overcoming, and the Human Narrative
The practical strategies of conventional virtue ethics align with Nietzsche’s
insistence that our moral progression has led us to this point that “the decisive value of an
action lies precisely in what is unintentional in it.”180 When actions become habits, then
we are less dependent upon navigating the problematic psychology of intention.
However, conventional theorists such as Aristotle hold a much more optimistic view of
the efficacy of our capacity for self-cultivation than does Nietzsche, most likely owing to
more robust ontologies of self and agency. Ridley observes that Nietzsche’s prioritization
of self-cultivation can be summarized in two seemingly contradictory encouragements: to
both become who we are, and to overcome who we are. 181 If the foundation of agency —
our deep character — consists in type facts that are largely inaccessible and
unchangeable, then any encouragements to “become” this nature would strike us as
irrelevant, because how could we do otherwise? Similarly, any instructions to
“overcome” these type facts seem to be demanding the impossible.
In order to interpret this paradox, it only makes sense that Nietzsche has two
different kinds of deep character in mind, and that he encourages us to instantiate or
“become” the type facts in the case of the first, and to overcome them in the second
sense. The first kind of type facts fall into the category of “capacities,” and include those
features of our character which are fixed, and unchangeable. The second kind of type
facts we can assume to be “dispositions,” and these constitute habituated and malleable
patterns of drives which lead to regular kinds of behaviors, such as the virtues discussed
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above. To restate the virtue theory argument: it is reasonable that through practice and
self-cultivation, we may effect change over our dispositions in order to develop new ones
or weaken old ones. In interpreting the call to “overcome” the self, we might conclude
that Nietzsche wishes us to enrich our state of being by acquiring new and better virtues.
This is no doubt true, but it is only a part of Nietzsche’s reasoning. In Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes: “Ten times a day you must overcome yourself, that makes
for a good weariness and is poppy for the soul” and then “Ten times you must reconcile
yourself again with yourself, for overcoming causes bitterness and the unreconciled sleep
badly.” 182 This implies that there are two effects of the same process of overcoming. This
is possible because these effects occur in two ways, at two different levels of our deep
character. When we direct our energies to self-overcoming, and to cultivating our
dispositions, this is beneficial to us, because we achieve access to a better kind of
narrative of self, and we may improve the state of our drives to bring them into a more
beneficial harmony with that which cannot be changed: the type facts which comprise our
capacities.
While we can apply this distinction to argue the possibility and advantage of selfovercoming, it may not be initially clear how it accommodates the instruction toward
self-becoming. In a famous aphorism in The Gay Science, Nietzsche writes: “What does
your conscience say? — ‘You should become who you are.’” 183 Once again, the most
reasonable interpretation is that in passages such as this, Nietzsche is urging us to engage
with our deep character, only this instruction is an appeal to one’s capacities — the deep
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character which is a fundamental and static feature of who we are. Why is this a
significant kind of claim — to become what we already are? And why does this
constitute such an important part of the overall process of developing the narrative of
self? In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche expands on this recurrent theme: “To become what one is,
one must not have the faintest notion what one is.”184 The reason that becoming what we
are is an important ethical problem rather than a simple redundancy is because we might
be wrong, or worse: misguided about what we are. In fact, to restate Nietzsche’s view, we
cannot know our deep character in any meaningful or reliable way. All that we know of
our deep character is that as agents we are fundamentally constituted with both the
capacity and disposition toward the will to power. How effectively we are able to will
power is a matter of whether the sum of our other values and drives cohere or conflict
with this fundamental aim.
The fact that we cannot know what we are is an important clue to interpreting
Nietzsche’s claim that a necessary condition of becoming is not actually knowing what
we are. To begin with, if we believe to have knowledge of the inaccessible drives and
motives which comprise deep character, we are likely to be wrong. If we hold a narrative
of deep character as a model of our essential being, then it is a short step to letting this
narrative dictate the course of our choices, actions, and any power we may have over the
development of our dispositions. To relinquish the course of our potential development to
a flawed idea of our limitations is to accept unnecessary constraints on what we are
capable of becoming. Here is the heart of the problem — we may be misled into
accepting such a defective narrative in the interest of purposeful restriction of the range
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of our capacities, in order to hold our development into a prescribed range, an egalitarian
mean. While some forms of egalitarianism are beneficial, the kinds which restrict the
growth of those with exceptional capacities to bring them into balance with a range of
capacities which is universal to all individuals will effectively eliminate the expression of
exceptional character. 185 Once again, Nietzsche’s concern lies with who appropriates
control of the narrative of human agency, and to what end they set the terms of what it
means to fall into a prescribed and range of human dispositions and capacities. Recall
that simply by virtue of the conditions of authentic agency, there is normative value in
avoiding circumstances which inhibit our potentiality to become who we really are – our
maximum manifestation of drives in harmony with the will to power. 186 Because some
individuals lack the capacity to will and overcome resistances at the same level of others,
given the opportunity, these individuals could seek to alter the standards of what
constitutes both normal and exemplary capacities, and to determine what specific virtues
we should hold and in what degrees. 187
In the last chapter, I discussed the normative value of exemplar narratives that
function as a kind of ideal range of human virtues. Lacking access to any metaphysically
necessary foundation of selfhood, we only have access to perspectives of an ontology —
our narrative representations of what it means to be human, including what it means to
become an exemplar type. For Nietzsche, merely by virtue of being agents, our
constitutive aim of willing power entails the ongoing pursuit of resistances to overcome.
The ultimate manifestation of perpetual overcoming is of the self. We continuously push
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the boundaries of this narrative, testing our capacities to overcome new levels of
resistance, and to the extent that we have the power, we modify our dispositions to bring
our values and our drives into coherence with better forms of the narrative. We may
presume that a human being is free to become and overcome their narrative of self within
the constraints of the collective type facts which comprise their capacities. But even this
is not completely true. Dispositions place further contingent constraints upon how
effectively we fulfill the ultimate potential of our capacities. Determinations about the
kinds of dispositions that we cultivate are influenced by our values. If we allow ourselves
to internalize the values of others who would impose their will over us, as a mechanism
of control, then our capacity to “become who we are” is compromised.
In the chapter that follows, I will explore specific ways that this anxiety over who
controls the human narrative manifests itself in aesthetic representation. Each of the
science fiction narratives that I will discuss builds upon a dichotomy of authenticity,
represented in the difference between humanity and artificial versions of humanity.
Importantly, as the history of science fiction cinema and literature began to approach this
dichotomy in more sophisticated ways, ontological narratives began to reveal our
intuition that the conventional approach to the dichotomy is flawed. In breaking down our
presumptions of what it means to be human, to become human, and to instantiate a range
of the exemplary virtue set of humanity, these narratives also address how our culturally
imposed versions of the human narrative can limit our fundamental capacities through
narratives of institutional control, othering, and abuse.
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CHAPTER 3
SCIENCE FICTION FILM AND THE HUMAN NARRATIVE
3.1 Introduction: The Moral Value of Narrative
Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality in the pejorative sense reduce to the same general
argument: every principle which presumes an objective ground of truth in order to derive
moral value already rests upon a series of myths about the world, ourselves, and the
relationship between. Consequently, such systems cannot prescribe responses to ethical
challenges with the rigid objectivity that they presume. Worse, the untenable myths such
as those advanced by MPS are self-defeating — slipping points on the way to relativism
and nihilism. While conventional moral skeptics may regard the “ungrounding” of truth
correspondence as the negation of value, for Nietzsche, there is no actual epistemic
advantage in dismissing the possibility of knowledge simply because we cannot access its
ground as a necessity, nor in rejecting affirmative ethics because we cannot identify the
origin or nature of agency. In the way that we order our experiences, truth and illusion are
something that we synthesize in a world, and in a fundamental sense, to posit patterns in
one’s deeds is to implicitly give an account of agency. We think of consistent patterns of
actions as reflecting some form of the deep character of agents. In forming existential
narratives, we then impose value on certain ways of living above others based upon
specific perspectives on the circumstances in which we exist. Our most valued of these
perspectives express the character of our exemplars – the ways that agents should (and
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do) act, accounting for a mythologized relationship between self, society, and world. In
this way, we find answers to questions concerning what our ethical obligations are and
how these obligations are justified. The challenge we face is in enculturating sustainable
myths — for Nietzsche this means exemplar narratives that successfully embody
aesthetic merit.
3.2 Narrative, Genre, and an Account of Virtue
Narrative is an important evaluative tool for us. In the same way that any account
of the world is inescapably perspectival, narrative fiction can communicate value to us by
limiting what we experience in the representation of the world into specific perspectives,
and by guiding us to focus on specific features of its subjects’ fictional lives. 188 In this
way, popular narratives tend to exemplify moral perspectives by showing us a range of
character types and actions, and through various techniques of form and style, by guiding
us to evaluate some positively and others negatively. As Joseph Kupfer states, “Narrative
arts have always emphasized the character of their characters […].” 189 Because our
judgments of moral character tend to be based upon consistent patterns of action, virtue is
most easily understood if we have access to the history of an agent. Narratives present
simulations — thought experiments — involving how fictional agents (characters) act in
a variety of different situations (plot), and thereby reveal what may constitute worthy
virtue sets for us. 190 Through narrative form, we have the opportunity to “rehearse” what
the exemplary human life does and does not look like. Unburdened by the contingent
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constraints of existing within the realm of the familiar and the possible, details of our
existence can be abstracted to test conventional ethical models and explore how a number
of beliefs that we take to be essential to the moral narrative are actually ill-conceived or
inconsistent with other values that are more fundamental to us. Kupfer elaborates further
on the relationship between narrative art and ethics: “Audiences, elite and popular, are
drawn to questions of virtue and vice perhaps because so much of our welfare depends on
our own character and because we prosper and suffer at the hands of other people on
account of their moral traits.”
In other words, knowing how to recognize different kinds of moral character in
the absence of objectively grounded moral systems is so central to our realm of concern
that virtue is thematically pervasive in our narratives. Themes and ideas that are matters
of enduring concern for us are those which we are drawn to re-enact in various forms. A
popular theory known as the “ritual performative theory” holds that we are motivated to
re-enact the same kinds of themes and situations over and over again because of a deep
psychological drive to ritualize enduring values through practice and repetition. 191 When
we consider kinds of narratives, we intuit that most can be classified into informal
categories based on some criteria of similarity. We know these categories as genres.
According to the ritual theory, genres are an extension of the process of symbolically
maintaining things that we value through ritual performance. 192
While examples of narratives exploring moral themes may fall into a variety of
genres, here I will argue that science fiction narratives are uniquely situated to ritualize
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our interests and concerns related to our formulations of virtue sets and the exemplar
types that exhibit them. Exemplars in science fiction narratives often exhibit a range of
virtues that diverge from the conventional sets, and into the realm of Nietzschean value:
artificial beings perform the necessity to create a self in the absence of an objectively
grounded essence of self.
Like other genres, the criteria that conventionally distinguish a narrative into the
category of science fiction are broad. There are often elements which stand in some kind
of noteworthy contrast with our actual world. These elements may include an emphasis
on advanced technology, travel to alien settings, or significantly for this discussion,
narratives dealing with robots, cyborgs, AI, clones, or other kinds of beings presented as
“simulating” humanity in some way. Author Philip K. Dick argues that while any of these
elements are commonly present in science fiction narratives, the distinguishing
characteristics of science fiction are more general, over and above any of these thematic
elements. According to Dick, the hallmark of a science fiction narrative is that it presents
either an unusual or “eccentric” perspective of an ordinary setting, or an ordinary
perspective of an unusual setting, and then introduces something novel — an idea —
which initiates a change in this setting, impacting the lives and world of the characters.
Dick notes that what distinguishes good science fiction from the commonplace or inferior
is that the best narratives often do more than simply astonish audiences with the
introduction of the outlandish; they posit answers to hypothetical questions about these
novel ideas and extraordinary elements, and in the process, illuminate some unexplored
aspects of our actual world. 193 In other words, science fiction stories can function as
193
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counterfactual thought experiments, with some impossible or improbable element
realized in the diegesis to highlight the effect of the novel upon the familiar.
3.3 The Human Narrative
In presenting a narrative which is bound up in a sense of wonder with a world that
is both fundamentally like and unlike our own world in some important ways, most
contemporary works of science fiction offer us either a perspective of something
imperfect about the world and a way it might ideally be otherwise (the “Utopian”
perspective), or a dark glimpse of where we may be headed if we are unable to alter the
trajectory of our society (the “dystopian” perspective). Through the lens of these
perspectives, science fiction narratives prompt us to scrutinize various conventional
beliefs concerning what it means to be the kind of beings that we are, and to value
different kinds of actions on this basis. Because of this, those ontological narratives of
human types are well-suited thought experiments in ethics. These specific kinds of
science fiction narratives effectively illustrate the arguments developed in the prior
sections – specifically, that our moral values are most stable if grounded in aesthetic
models, and that among the most fundamental of these aesthetic models is the narrative
of what it actually means to be a human being, in some kind of meaningful sense.
Through the narrative conceptualization of a human life, there is an exemplar
model which situates us in relation to an ideal moral standard to identify with, one that
we may also value as aesthetically pleasing. The human protagonists of science fiction
may not always be “exemplars” in the traditional sense, but they are nevertheless
hypothetical moral surrogates, exploring what is actually at stake for us in the often
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arbitrary and misguided process by which we distinguish what qualifies as authentic or
artificial expressions of virtue and exemplary “human-ness,” in a setting in which, strictly
speaking, biologically human beings may not be the only beings capable of moral
reasoning and responsibility.
An effective way to understand what a functional representation of the human
exemplar would look like is to contrast it with what it is clearly not, through a series of
counterexamples. Assume that an authentic human being is understood to possess a
minimum threshold of some essential characteristics. The “counterfeit” human being of
science fiction narratives will often function in one of two ways. First, the “simulated”
version of the human being will possess an incomplete set of these characteristics,
thereby emphasizing the authenticity of its “real” human counterpart by comparison. This
essential lack may present the artificial being as a threat to the world of the authentic
beings in the narrative. Alternately, the artificial, or “simulated” human may be portrayed
as inauthentic based upon some criteria which we discover to be insignificant or arbitrary,
and in this way, the narrative criticizes standing normalized criteria by which we would
account for authenticity in humanity.
When we quantify what it means to be human, we generally want to employ
criteria beyond simple organism or mechanism. We usually have in mind a specific range
of characteristics, analogous to a virtue set — something moral, something which is
revealed in one’s deeds, and not in one’s physical makeup. When we consider narratives
which instantiate kinds of exemplars, the human virtue set may serve as a narratively
constructed “essence” of the exemplary human type. Where science may offer at least
some persuasive arguments to the contrary, we aspire to narratives that hold the essence
103

of humanity to be something more noble than an accident of biology. Though this is
optimism on our parts, we see the right kinds of deeds as exemplifying the nature of the
human agent; humanity is a kind of good character. Virtue is therefore thematically
pervasive in the way that we organize perspectives of the world through narrative. This is
the enduring value that is ritualized in a genre that is uniquely preoccupied with
performing what it means to be a human being in a world. To expand on Kupfer’s
argument: while narrative arts emphasize “the character of their characters,” it is science
fiction narratives that emphasize the human-ness of their humans. Narratives imply a
sense of what our exemplars should look like even when our protagonists fail to embody
them. There is a kind of tragic nobility in pushing back against an existence which
challenges our moral development and resists our potential to fully actualize our
humanity.
While this account of virtue offers advantages over the various forms of MPS, it
is reasonable to be cautious of relying too exclusively upon the didactic power of
narrative in order to ground the aesthetic value of our moral ideas. For one thing, we
understand that the elements of narratives have not been selected and organized based on
truth correspondence, but on their capacity to produce specific aesthetic effects in
audiences. A narrative, even one which intends a historical kind of factuality, must
introduce its facts from a perspective, and thereby exclude something of the world in its
depiction. A successful narrative does not present itself as an exhaustive litany of such
facts, but as a plot — a selected organization of story elements into a sequence which
may exaggerate or edit events in the interest of telling the story more effectively. This is
usually not reflective of a natural sequence, which is a problem for didacticism. If we see
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moral value in a narrative because it allows us to rehearse moral dilemmas that bear some
significant resemblance to those in the real world, then it is a complication if such a
narrative were to falsify, distort, confuse, or outright misrepresent the facts of these cases.
This critique follows the logic of Plato’s mirror argument: mimesis is an inferior way of
reproducing the world and so it is useless to look to art as a guide for our actions. 194
Recall that Nietzsche’s response to this argument is fairly simple. The primary
function of art is not epistemic, and yet art is the only means by which an otherwise
meaningless existence is made endurable. 195 Any inaccuracies in an aesthetic
representation of the world do not necessarily conflict with this aim. In fact, remember
that truthfulness, in its plenitude, is harmful to us. However, an excessively delusional
perspective of the world is not sustainable either. Art that succeeds as an existential
outlook must balance the Apollonian and the Dionysian impulses — the comforting
illusion of structure coming into harmony with its antithesis — the overwhelming reality
of the “primordial unity,” in which structure and individuation are revealed as illusory.
The problem with the Apollonian forms of pure narrative — drama, and lyric poetry — is
that they inhibit a vital component of the meaningful aesthetic experience, and in them
the value of the sublime is diluted. In Dionysian art, we become lost in the “intoxicating”
effects of the primordial unity, embodied in music and dance. 196 Nietzsche praises the
dialectic reconciliation of the Apollonian and the Dionysian that takes place in the form
of Attic tragedy. The best works of tragedy must satisfy our intuition that there is nothing
inherently safe or familiar that is necessarily woven into the fabric of reality, but they
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must also provide us with enough of structure to orient ourselves in relation to them and
allow us to make sense of their patterns.
I have argued that contemporary science fiction narratives can adequately fulfill
the role of moral thought experiments because of the content of their narratives, primarily
those that explore the nature of human beings and their relationship to a world. If such
narratives could carry the weight of the Nietzschean “extra-moral” ethic — a way of
living valued primarily on aesthetic grounds — then there would have to be something in
these narratives that also reflects a range of dialectic tension between Apollonian and
Dionysian elements. There are many ways that this could work. As a general example,
consider a narrative which makes moral perspectives explicit in its plot, while also
focusing on the sublime features of human existence that cannot easily be reduced to
conventional logic or morality. The resulting tension between the dual approach could
produce a narrative space in which the tragic condition of the human being is emphasized
in an aesthetic way. In contrast with the more optimistic view of classical Eudaimonism,
in the contrast of rational beings with an irrational or indifferent world, there is an
implicit emphasis on the theme of meeting and overcoming resistance — which for
Nietzsche, is a constitutive aim of human agency, and as such is one of the only
universally prescriptive values. 197
While themes of ontology and overcoming resistance are common in the mythical
narratives of Attic tragedy, Nietzsche’s appraisal of these works extends beyond the
content of the stories they tell to the form in which their narratives are presented. The
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first and most fundamental argument that Nietzsche introduces in The Birth of Tragedy is
that the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses which together give rise to Attic tragedy
each manifest in very different kinds of formal expression, the Apollonian in the art of the
image-maker and the Dionysian in the “image-less” art of music. 198 This synthesis is
most salient where the “dream-images” of Apolline lyrical scenes give way to the very
“un-Apolline” choral passages called dithyrambs. 199 While Nietzsche does not articulate
in detail what the dithyramb sounds like, he does describe its effects: an ecstatic
departure of form, inspiring some pure, immanent feeling above and beyond the
experiences we rationally process. In this state, we are overtaken by the sublime beauty
of that which threatens the comfort of our Apollonian veil. 200 Authentic aesthetic
experience is something that requires giving up control to this feeling, to some degree.
We know that the Apollonian is partially “dishonest” in its presentation — the dreamlike
illusion of a world. A purely Apollonian narrative may still employ its fictions as a form
of ritual or rehearsal — as a thought experiment — but we would once again find
ourselves in a regress as to what qualifies as the criterion of value for our ethical
conclusions. 201 Our affective response to the sublime involves some level of releasing
control to our impulses. In order for some moral outlook or way of living to hold
aesthetic merit, we must be moved by its beauty at a deeper level.
To be clear, the specific choral device of the dithyramb is not the only expression
of Dionysian influence in Attic tragedy, but as I have stated, Nietzsche presents it as one
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of the most salient examples. As I argue films to be narrative forms that are particularly
well-suited to demonstrate the aesthetic value of moral perspectives, I raise the question
of whether there is something in these works that functions analogously to the Attic
dithyramb. It is one thing to argue that the content of specific science fiction film
narratives resembles human life in such a way as to test moral ideas through
counterfactual scenarios, and another to state that we value exemplary human narratives
in primarily aesthetic ways. Film narratives communicate their meanings to us in
complex ways, and on multiple sensory levels simultaneously, both explicitly and
implicitly. Films employ a variety of interrelated techniques to this end, many of which
manipulate our senses and emotions, and in so doing, influence the way that we feel
about a subject. The most obvious analog to the dithyramb is a film’s musical score and
ambient sound design, which may be activating feelings and responses to the narrative
content at a level below our awareness. However, this is not the only technique that film
employs in this way; various kinds of visual imagery and iconography, the “beats” and
rhythms of editing transitions, a film’s use of light and color, spatial relationships
between figures, how subjects are framed — all of these elements, among others, taken
together may represent the “tragic chorus” of a film’s stylistic language.
As I have argued and now hope to demonstrate, a study of science fiction framed
in this context will add new dimensions to a reading of Nietzsche’s critique of ethics,
which will in turn help us to articulate details of how the concept of humanity is
conventionally constructed, the normative functions of this narrative construction, and its
usefulness to us under the conditions in which we exist. It is fairly straightforward to
suggest that film has the potential to be incredibly poetic in its expression. I will make a
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slightly stronger claim: science fiction films — in particular, those works that most
effectively represent their ontological themes — function as Attic myths of the
contemporary era.
3.4 Two Frankensteins: A Framework for Understanding the Human Narrative
Though the genre category would not come into usage until a century after its first
publication, Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus is often
retroactively regarded as the first work of science fiction. Whether true or not, this claim
implies that the novel either introduces new kinds of narrative themes or explores
familiar themes in new ways. To some extent, both of these conditions are true.
Conceived in a post-enlightenment world, Frankenstein offers a uniquely dark
(dystopian) view of a world well-aware of new technological capacities to actualize many
things that were previously impossible. The novel, like many subsequent works of
science fiction, reflects the technological dynamism of its world, exploring various
concerns over where the trajectory of progress may take us.
Recall that for Philip K. Dick the distinguishing characteristic of science fiction is
the broad concept of the “novel idea” which impacts the world of the narrative and
provokes change in the lives of its characters. The reason that this idea is so often a
technological element is that through technological progress, novel concepts transition
from the realm of the fantastical to become practical, or even inevitable. As technology
has become more sophisticated, so has our ability to technologically replicate, and in
some cases replace various human activities. In fact, the rate of technological
advancement in society is increasing along an exponential curve rather than a linear
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slope, leading Ray Kurzweil to voice the concern that we will soon cross a threshold at
which the impact of technology on human life will have permanently altered what human
life actually is (if we have not already). 202 While the debate about the advantages and
risks of technological transhumanism is ongoing, a relatively neglected implication is that
the theoretical possibility of technologically-created beings simulating humanity would
render the “human” a trivial categorization. Fittingly, John Wilson refers to this as “The
Frankenstein Problem”. 203 While a difference of causal origins (e.g., being born rather
than being constructed in a lab) would still distinguish two such beings, this does not
seem like a significant enough means of differentiation, if the beings are otherwise
physically and functionally identical.
Wilson and transhumanist theorists who followed him are primarily concerned
with the progress of technology ultimately outpacing us, replacing us, or rendering us
obsolete in its wake; I am more interested in the ontological questions that the
Frankenstein Problem raises: what is a human being, and why is this question so difficult
for us to answer? Is there a meaningful way of distinguishing the human from that which
simulates it? At this point, I should re-introduce a distinction proposed earlier. Many
works of science fiction engage with the ontological question through narratives which
juxtapose the human with the non-human in order to illustrate some criterion of
difference. Often this distinction is explored by introducing a kind of being that simulates
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the form of an authentic human but fails to do so by notably lacking some features that
the narrative implies to be essential to a more “proper” form of humanity.
The novel Frankenstein depicts the events leading up to and following the
creation, through some obscure scientific process, of a being which is never named, and
often only referred to as “the creature,” or by the protagonist as “the wretch” or “the
monster”. This creature is a being that is consistently described as horrifying in outward
appearance, and yet recognizable as approximately physically human, and displaying at
least some of the same capacities and dispositions of human beings. Based on its physical
differences alone, this creature could never be mistaken as naturally-human, and so in
some sense at least, the “lack” which differentiates it from authentic humanity is clear.
However, is the lack represented in this narrative construction essential to the distinction?
Are these ontological differences significant or relevant to our concept of the human?
Actually, we will find that an answer to this question is contingent upon which version of
the creature we use as our ontological model — which Frankenstein are we talking
about?
The way that the creature is depicted has evolved across the various adaptations
and incarnations of Frankenstein, resulting in differences in how the narrative reflects
intuitions about the concept of the human being. The earliest and possibly the most
significant of these changes was undertaken by Shelley herself in the 1831 edition of the
novel. While Shelley notes in the preface to this edition that the majority of her revisions
to the original 1818 version of the text were mostly minor stylistic revisions, Despina
Kakoudaki points out that it is the preface itself that introduces a noteworthy and
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compelling editorial change. 204 In addition to a brief account of the genesis of Shelley’s
idea for the novel, the preface includes commentary clarifying Shelley’s attitude toward
one of its more ambivalent plot elements:
Frightful must it be; for supremely frightful would be the effect of any human
endeavor to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world. His
success would terrify the artist; he would rush away from his odious handywork,
horror-stricken. He would hope that, left to itself, the slight spark of life which
he had communicated would fade; that this thing, which had received such
imperfect animation, would subside into dead matter […] 205
Shelley’s response here becomes prescriptive for us — this is how we are intended to
interpret Frankenstein’s cruel rejection of his creation. The rejection is significant,
because rejection appears to be the primary, if not exclusive, inciting event of the
compounding tragedies that unfold over the course of the novel. Upon realizing the
successful animation of his creation, Frankenstein recoils from its appearance:
Oh! No mortal could support the horror of that countenance. A mummy again
endued with animation could not be so hideous as that wretch. I had gazed on
him while unfinished; he was ugly then; but when those muscles and joints were
rendered capable of motion, it became a thing such as even Dante could not
have conceived. 206
It is notable that Frankenstein’s horror is grounded in a visceral response to the
creature’s appearance, on aesthetic terms; the creature is “hideous,” “wretched,” and
“ugly.” While the De Lacey family’s later rejection of the creature is the event which
provokes his first violent eruption, it is the earlier rejection by his creator, and the further
discovery of the circumstances surrounding the initial rejection, which exacerbates the
creature’s rage. Without Shelley’s commentary, Frankenstein’s actions seem cruel and
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inexcusable — a shallow disregard for the feelings and welfare of another being that is
obviously capable of experiencing emotion, and that is also obviously in a position of
need. We may very easily empathize with the creature’s motivations, even if we cannot
sympathize with his later actions. However, when we consider the comments in the 1831
preface, Frankenstein’s actions in rejecting the creature are preemptively framed as
understandable, conscionable, even expected under the circumstances.
Kakoudaki rightly interprets our response to the moral implications of
Frankenstein’s actions as contingent on whether we prioritize the political implications of
the creature’s treatment, or the ontological basis of justification for this treatment. 207
Shelley obviously prioritizes the latter, which entails the view that by virtue of what kind
of being the creature is, Frankenstein has no obligations toward its well-being. In the first
place, the creature should never have been created — it has no right to exist. Since its
creation has already occurred, the next best thing is for the creature to die. 208 In the
protagonist’s panic, lacking the resolve to perform any act of mercy killing when he has
the opportunity, the only remaining acceptable outcome is its rejection, to be left to the
elements, left to perish of neglect. The only way that Shelley can justify this apparent
cruelty is to regard the creature as fundamentally non-human, and therefore not deserving
of the same social acceptance and humane treatment. 209 The problem with this view is
that despite its violent tendencies, the creature exemplifies many characteristics that we
associate with a post-enlightenment human ontological narrative contemporary to
Shelley. The creature is not just a mechanism; it has agency, and a sophisticated capacity
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for both reason and emotion. It is not even clear that the creature’s violent tendencies and
impulsiveness are properties that should necessarily exclude it from the category of
human, as these characteristics are also common in human beings. It is likely that Shelley
was aware of the effect of these traits in her characterization but deemed them less
important than the contribution of specific values to a presumptive ontological (and by
extension, political) status for the creature. Shelley’s ontological view is grounded in a
commitment to a religious view, in which the very existence of the creature is an
abomination, and so it is afforded no basic human rights.
Taken independently of the preface, the narrative does not automatically prescribe
approval of Frankenstein’s rejection of the creature. As Kakoudaki observes, the “social
death” of the creature appears as an arbitrary punishment, and the ontological
justifications of this punishment resemble many of the supposed ‘arguments from nature’
that ground racist ideologies.” 210 Whether or not we were to interpret Frankenstein’s
initial act of creation as a transgression against nature, his subsequent actions would still
be morally objectionable by this criterion.
The ambivalence of the Frankenstein narrative is reflected in a range of different
characterizations and adaptations, varying in degrees between two distinct moral
positions: the creature as an abomination or monster, and the creature as an authentic
human subject. To make a conceptual distinction, I will refer to the narrative type which
presents Frankenstein’s creature as a pure “monster” with the phrase “m-type narrative”
and the type which presents the creature as fundamentally human or human-like in some
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significant way as an “h-type narrative”. Generally, science fiction narratives — those
which take as their novel idea the synthetic being simulating the authentic — resemble
some mode or mixture of the m and h narratives, and the primary ontological themes
explored in them.
The influence of the m-type narrative on the science fiction genre results in works
that emphasize the danger of ontological difference, including such films as: Metropolis
(1927), 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968), Westworld (1973), Alien (1979), Saturn 3 (1980),
The Terminator (1984), Hardware (1990), The Matrix (1999), among others. The effect
of this emphasis is usually an overlap with the genre of horror. The prevalence and
popularity of these films indicates our apprehension about a society in which artificial
beings exist, and about the potential threat that they would represent to us. It is not just
the case that these beings may not be capable of authentically instantiating the
fundamental characteristics of a human being — they may not wish to. For such a being,
there may be nothing of value in humanity. 211
The most influential example of the m-type narrative may be the 1931 film
adaptation of Frankenstein, directed by James Whale. While this film has many levels of
aesthetic merit, it must be noted that in its adaptation, it has extracted much of the
ontological and moral ambivalence present in Shelley’s novel and adopted the same
sentiments toward the creature expressed in Shelley’s preface. In the film, the creature
simulates humanity in form only, and only this to a certain degree. This narrative portrays
the creature with an abnormality or lack of essentially human characteristics, thus
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rendering it as a monster. The specific characteristics that the creature appears to lack are
dispositions toward higher reasoning, self-restraint, and impulse control, and together
these deficiencies frequently result in the violent and destructive expression of its rage.
Because of this, the film is primarily an ontological narrative of difference rather than of
same-ness. We never approach any true ambivalence about this creature’s humanity; it is
presented as more animal than human, owing to the flawed range of human capacities. In
the film, these essential flaws are a symptom of a defect in physiology – specifically, the
creature is endowed with a brain harvested from the body of a murderer. Because of this,
the creature can never achieve the status of an authentic human subject. In fact, it may not
even satisfy the conditions of higher life, above simple instinctive mechanism, as
Frankenstein (here renamed as Henry) asserts: “That body is not dead. It has never lived.
I created it.” The creature then both is and is not reducible to the aggregate of its
cadaverous composition. It is both something new that transcends the dead pieces of
other human beings of which it is constituted, and it is also something that is
fundamentally lesser than the origin of any of those parts. Yet obviously these
components have some effect on how the creature is endowed with different properties as
well as limitations. The being itself is necessarily a monster — animalistic, impulsive, a
bad thing. When Frankenstein asserts, “It is only a piece of dead tissue,” he is warned:
“Only evil can come of it.”
Early in the film, as we are first introduced to the newly animated being, its face
is illuminated primarily by directional lighting from above and below, both of which cast
extended shadows that distort its features, emphasizing the iconic wide forehead and deep
brow. The mechanical uniformity in the flattened dome of the creature’s cranium and
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protruding neck bolts stand in striking dissonance with the natural unevenness of its pale
decaying flesh lined with sutures. The effect is of a kind of “steampunk” cyborg. The
human being has been reduced to the animal, the animal ultimately reduced to the
material, and the material intersecting with the technological. The film effectively
represents a being far-removed from the domain of nature, and of life. It evokes a world
composed of death — mechanical, decaying.
Nevertheless, the film does communicate a shifting level of sympathy toward its
version of the creature in the way it is presented. When we are first introduced to the
creature in the darkness of Frankenstein’s laboratory, and then in the dungeon-like cell in
which it is confined, the effect of chiaroscuro lighting is to visually exaggerate its
inhumanity. Later, when the creature emerges into the world, and we see it in daylight,
the creature appears more naturally to us. With light filling in its features and giving its
facial expressions a more “normal” human appearance, there is more reason to view the
creature as endowed with emotion, and even a sense of wonder with its world. Having
viewed the creature this way, its treatment at the hands of the human mobs evokes the
revulsion we normally associate toward those who perform acts of cruelty. We
sympathize with the creature’s suffering. The sympathy we may experience toward the
creature does not likely extend to the point that we acknowledge the creature’s status as
an authentic human being. Much like an animal, the creature’s violence is not
premeditated, but reactive. Ultimately, the film’s narrative upholds the creature’s
destruction as a tragic necessity, as the removal of a threat to the ordered and rational
human world.
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In the end, the moral focus of the narrative is on Frankenstein himself — a
reflection of a human being absorbed by his own hubris nearly to the point of selfdestruction. As the apotheosis of the “mad scientist” archetype, Frankenstein intends the
monster’s existence to glorify his own, but in the process, he has created a being that only
knows conditions of abuse and rejection, and often reacts to these conditions with
violence toward human beings. There is a pervasive moral theme in this narrative, but it
is not about the arbitrariness of social difference, or the belief that all sentient beings are
afforded the same basic treatment. In other words, this is not a narrative of monsters
revealed to be humans, but a warning against humans thoughtlessly increasing cruelty in
the pursuit of egoistic aims.
3.5 Searching for “Human” in the “In-human”
While the 1931 film adaptation of Frankenstein effectively demonstrates the
common patterns and themes of an m-type narrative, its source novel Frankenstein is in
many more ways the prototypical h narrative type. The novel reflects a more sympathetic
view of the artificial subject, as unlike the film’s version, this creature is a being with the
legitimate capacities for complex emotions, advanced reason, and drives toward
flourishing and happiness. In the novel, details of the creature’s creation are no less
ghoulish, intended to frighten or disturb readers, but without the frame of Shelley’s
preface they do not necessarily stand as the affront to nature that Shelley presumes. We
cannot help but observe that the conditions of the creature’s emergence and developing
consciousness bear significant similarities to our own. When human beings mature to a
certain level of awareness, we discover that we inhabit a world not by choice, but by
circumstance, and that we are subject to factors of suffering, neglect, and loss which are
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largely beyond our powers to control. In spite of these conditions, Frankenstein’s creature
frequently exhibits the disposition to affirm life as inherently meaningful, even in the face
of ubiquitous suffering and loneliness. As an example: upon his tragic rejection by the De
Lacey family, the creature briefly contemplates suicide, but is so affected by the inherent
beauty of nature — of the world itself — that he withdraws from the abyss of nihilism. 212
This pattern recurs, with the creature experiencing isolation, fear, and despondency, only
to afterward be moved by a feeling of the sublime value of existence. When confronting
his creator, the creature explains, “Life, although it may only be an accumulation of
anguish, is dear to me, and I will defend it.” 213 The existential element adds nuance to the
creature’s characterization and is deeply ingrained in the narrative fabric of the novel.
While the creature perpetrates horrific acts, the acts are motivated by impulses
that are humanized, by way of the precipitating conditions of provocation and abuse. For
these reasons, among others, we can conclude that the narrative accepts some degree of
the proposition that authentic humanity results from properties of character rather than
circumstances of one’s biological origins, and that the former is not dependent on the
latter. Because the novel Frankenstein seems to indicate that a range of moral character is
possible in both human and non-human agents, this opens up the possibility of some
crossover of these properties, which frustrates attempts to essentialize any of them in the
conception of the human narrative. When we consider one of the fundamental
suppositions of the m-type narrative — that artificial beings of science fiction are usually
identified by some difference in or lack of characteristics that distinguish them from the
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authentic humans of the narrative — the alternate h-type narrative often implies any such
supposed difference to be arbitrary. An m-type narrative may uphold differences with the
intent of justifying the harm or exploitation of non-humans in the narrative — a rhetorical
tactic which often reduces the chance that we will empathize with the other, the monster.
But an h-type narrative acknowledges the intuition that our empathy toward the other
may be well-placed. In genre terms, the characteristics which we presume to be
conditions of authentic humanity may exist in a subject that is not actually biologically
human. Similarly, our intuitions may be confirmed when a subject that is biologically
human may come to lack these presumed characteristics, demonstrating a failure to
maintain their “human-ness” in some meaningful ways — a moral failure. By prompting
an emotional response to the treatment of artificial subjects, these narratives
communicate a moral perspective on the question of what it means to be human.
Artificial humans present counterexamples to the standing arbitrary criteria of
unlikeness — they function as a kind of narrative proxy for oppressed groups, a critique
of how human beings ground structures of oppression in arbitrary criteria of difference.
Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), loosely adapted from the Philip K. Dick Novel Do
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is one such narrative.
Blade Runner is a film which employs the h-type narrative paradigm to challenge
a conventional ontological model: that of a human being as necessarily a naturally
occurring biological organism with special properties of character that are unique to this
state. By juxtaposing human characters with artificially created human-like androids
called “replicants,” the film criticizes the basis on which we would view these beings as
necessarily inferior to their human counterparts. Like the creature in Shelley’s novel, it
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becomes apparent that it is at least possible for replicants to possess or develop those
unique traits that we associate with human-ness in the most important sense, whether they
qualify as biologically authentic or not.
The replicants of Blade Runner, like the synthetic beings of many works of
science fiction, face negative treatment because of their status as non-human. In m-type
narratives, this treatment is often justified on the grounds that “counterfeit” beings are
deservedly designated as the antagonists of the narrative — they are the aforementioned
monsters, villains, or are simply mindless mechanisms performing some default routine
which is harmful. Harm may not be the primary motivation of such villain types, but a
secondary consequence of some primary aim. Even the purely destructive T-800
“cyborg” in the film The Terminator is under the control of a utilitarian intelligence
which views the destruction of humanity as fundamentally good above and beyond the
harm it inflicts on those humans. Films like this are simply a high-tech version of the mtype Frankenstein, embodying some cultural anxiety we feel over whether futuristic
“super-AI” would have any logical reason to uphold values which are compatible with
the good of human beings. By contrast, in the case of Blade Runner, the replicant
antagonists are motivated by primary goals similar to our own: their intention is to
survive, and to enjoy some level of a flourishing life. Sometimes, much like humans,
replicants may inflict harm in pursuit of their primary aims, but this does not distinguish
them as monsters.
Because of their degree of similarity, grounding a distinction between authentic
human beings and replicants becomes necessary to a world which would maintain the
mistreatment and lower status of the latter by the former. Humans in Blade Runner use a
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justification of ontological difference, with the intent to reframe what we would
otherwise recognize as violence, exploitation, and abuse as an acceptable matter of
course, by virtue of what kinds of beings replicants are. If replicants are objects in the
purest sense — mere tools of humanity — then there is no abuse, as there is no actual
subject to experience this abuse. It would be strange to bestow human rights on a very
sophisticated refrigerator, or a smart-phone, for instance. 214 However, as Alf Seegert
notes, if replicants and humans share features that imply a fundamental commonality,
then it becomes more difficult for humans to ethically justify their mistreatment, and their
relegation into a lower class of being. 215 To add to this, even if replicants are somehow
“less” human in some way, but still capable of experiencing suffering, it would be easy to
argue that it is unethical to cause them to suffer.
In many ways, replicants do not appear to be as dissimilar to human beings as the
conventional distinction would require. In fact, their function in service to human beings
relies upon their similarity in some significant ways. These similarities are likely
engineered to facilitate the various functions for which replicants were created, all related
to their service as a proxy worker class. Replicants fulfill a variety of specialized servant
roles, including those explicitly mentioned in the film: soldiers, manual laborers, and sex
workers. Marilyn Gwaltney points out that in order to perform these roles, it is likely that
replicants require both a physical form similar to humans, in order to carry out the same
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kinds of tasks, and some degree of autonomy and the capacity for advanced reason, to
effectively negotiate challenges related to these tasks. 216
The existence of replicants reflects a feature of a very specific reality for humans
in the setting of Blade Runner’s dystopian Los Angeles of 2019. In this world, humans
have damaged the world to the point that the survival of a functional society is
threatened. 217 The environment is toxic — a detail underscored by the complete absence
of biological animal life, and the markedly degenerate state of the human life that
remains. If biological life can no longer thrive in this environment, then the artificial life
that supplements its labor would need to be much more resilient. 218 Because of this, the
most noticeable physical differences between the two types of beings appear related to
the specific ways in which replicants excel at humanness – their capacity to be “more
human than human,” a question-begging pronouncement of their ontological condition by
the Tyrell Corporation that produces them. One of the ways that this is most evident is in
the physical strength of replicants. It is also established that replicants are manufactured
to perform those tasks associated with life on off-world colonies which are carried out in
conditions adverse or unfavorable to biological human beings. This means that replicants
are designed to endure conditions of suffering. But how do we know that they actually
suffer? How do we know whether they are nothing more than mechanisms sophisticated
enough to perform their tasks effectively, or whether their resemblance to humans also
extends to the capacity for authentic consciousness and feeling?
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Our best evidence that replicants are capable of suffering is their responses to
conditions of suffering. The physical resilience of replicants does not appear to mitigate
their suffering in any important ways. We see the replicant Pris bare-handedly pull an egg
from boiling water without suffering any apparent injury or pain. We also see her
affected by the same existential distress of loss and finitude which plagues human
existence. We see Pris and her companion Roy Batty express resentfulness at the humans
who uphold their subjugation and impose their suffering. The narrative portrays these
replicants in ways that imply their actions to be motivated by real pain, rather than
simulated. Like us, they not only have the capacity to experience suffering, but the
sophisticated powers of reason through which they may also question the circumstances
of their suffering, as well as a variety of other factors related to the conditions of their
existence. In Blade Runner, replicant characters are motivated by a will to survive and to
avoid mistreatment, to flourish, and they appear to be endowed with the characteristically
“human” capacity of reason with which to pursue these ends. The problem is that for
replicants these pursuits are constrained by their social role, which involves social death
— the complete lack of any intrinsic rights that personhood entails. To justify the
exclusion of replicants from human rights on the basis of being different from the
category of humanity would require a convincing account of what this difference consists
in.
To explain how Blade Runner’s ontological themes function as a kind of reductio
ad absurdum a conventional human narrative, Ross Barham discusses the supposed
differences between humans and replicants in terms of Aristotle’s Four Causes. The
differences that the efficient, the material, and the formal causes reveal are essentially
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incontrovertible, on the basis of the artificial origins of replicants; replicants are designed
in the form of humans and produced by the Tyrell corporation out of various synthetic
materials, while biological humans are born and develop through natural biological
processes, and are composed of organic matter such as flesh, cells, and proteins. 219 In
order to establish that there is no meaningful ontological difference between the two
categories of beings, we would have to hold these causal differences to be insignificant.
This is simple, because the form of the argument already presumes that these differences
are a condition of the comparison. The premise that I begin from in this chapter can be
stated in the following way: the narrative of the film Blade Runner persuades us that
artificially created human-like beings are not necessarily distinct enough from true
biological human beings to warrant their mistreatment on the basis of this distinction.
While a variety of theories could discount the significance of the efficient, formal, and
material causal differences between replicants and humans, it is beyond the scope of the
current argument to explore the merits and problems of such theories. Instead, I am
concerned with the implications of applying Aristotle’s final cause — the purpose of a
thing’s existence.
Aristotle’s final cause, or as it is applied to his study of human ethics, the function
argument, is significant, because when we consider the narrative of Blade Runner, the
argument highlights the most prominent differences between human beings and
replicants. 220 Because they are created for the purpose of performing specific service
tasks, it is reasonable to conclude that the final cause of replicants is to provide labor —
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to serve the will of human beings. 221 Because there are no such superseding duties or
demands universally placed on the activity of human beings, the function of a human
being is less obvious to identify, but Aristotle has an answer. By virtue of being human,
we are endowed with kinds of rational capacities, and our function — our final cause —
is to develop these capacities, and through cultivating the right dispositions, express them
in rational activity. 222 According to Aristotle, our function is to be happy, to flourish, to
enjoy the most sustainable state of eudaimonia possible, and when we are engaged in
rational activity is when we are most consistently in this state (footnote: do not worry for
the moment that Nietzsche convincingly argues this aim is not a sustainable goal. 223 The
problem should be obvious now: replicants regularly demonstrate those same rational
capacities, and in some cases, the same cultivated dispositions toward those activities and
states that supposedly denote well-functioning humanity. 224 The fact that replicants were
intended to be exploited makes no difference if they are capable of the same suffering
and striving that we are, and it is just as reasonable to presume that their ideal function
consists in the same kinds of activities as ours does. Aristotle contradicts his own view,
by dismissing the capacities of different groups of human beings that no doubt possess
those capacities that he denies them. Like many of the characters in Blade Runner,
Aristotle takes the untenable position of justifying the subjugation of groups of persons
on the grounds of denying their full humanity. 225
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A good argument can be made that the shared capacity for higher rational
functioning establishes a fundamental similarity between humans and replicants, and
following from Aristotle’s function argument, that there is no good justifiable reason to
exclude beings like replicants from participation in the same rights afforded biological
humans. However, the humans in Blade Runner who hold replicants to be a lower class
of being do not dismiss the fact that replicants are intelligent, or even autonomously
rational. Like many other science fiction narratives, in Blade Runner it is fairly obvious,
even expected, that artificial human beings are sophisticated AI that can function at a
high cognitive level at least equal to that of human beings. Instead, the distinguishing
characteristic which replicants are believed to lack, and which designates them as lesser
beings on that basis, is the capacity for empathy. In theory, empathy as a necessary and
sufficient condition of authentic humanity serves the narrative model well, as it requires a
sophisticated level of cognitive and emotional functioning and facilitates the development
of moral reasoning.
Empathy is a specific kind of reaction to our understanding of the experiences of
another. According to Gavin Fairbairn, it is a feeling related to, but distinct from, the
feeling of sympathy. Whereas sympathy is a kind of affective response to the experiences
we perceive that another is undergoing, empathy involves a reaction at a more cognitive
level, in which one can imaginatively project oneself into their situation, to grasp the
significance of their circumstances, and in this way gain some genuine understanding of
how they are affected by them. 226 A replicant displaying agency and a full range of
rational capacities, but lacking the capacity for empathy, seems conspicuously non226
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human because of this lack, making it easier to justify them as a threat — as potential
monsters. If replicants cannot genuinely empathize with others, then how can they really
act in the best interests of those others? Following from this scenario, then those
replicants that cannot be compelled to conform to their social role, or in this case, those
that have rebelled from this role, necessarily represent a threat to human society if for no
other reason than the fact that without the capacity for empathy, they could not even
accurately process what constitutes harm toward others in order to reliably avoid it.
Blade Runner lures us into an m-type narrative with a familiar setup — the
“technological horror” trope of androids as unfeeling machines. Over the course of the
narrative, the film subverts many of the conventional expectations of this narrative type
in order to establish itself as an h-type narrative. At the beginning of the film, a small
group of rogue replicants from “off-world” have escaped and returned to Earth. The
film’s opening crawl informs us that this is a common occurrence in this world,
necessitating a specialized kind of police force known as a “blade runners,” who are
tasked with hunting down and “retiring” these fugitive replicants. Because replicants are
otherwise indistinguishable from human beings in most important ways, the blade
runner’s primary tool in identifying them is an apparatus known as the “Voight-Kampff
test” (VK), meant to determine whether a subject has the capacity for empathy. The test
achieves this result by measuring involuntary physiological responses to questions
designed to provoke feelings of empathy in the subject. This method is presumed to be
effective, because no replicant in the film is capable of passing this test.
At the beginning of the film, a blade runner named Holden is applying the VK test
to a subject named Leon — the first of each that we are introduced to: blade runner and
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replicant. Leon is boorish and argumentative in the interview part of the test, but not
outwardly threatening, at least at first. Both characters are framed in medium closeup,
and the scene unfolds with a conventional pattern of crosscutting, back and forth between
the two. Eventually, Leon becomes nervous, and questions the validity of the
interrogation. As Holden’s questions become more probing, we see Leon’s
dismissiveness give way to confusion and agitation, and then, something changes in
Leon. Framed in closeup, Leon’s features contort in distress as he struggles with one of
Holden’s questions. 227 He flinches. Holden senses this tension in his subject and leans
back into his chair slightly, drawing from his cigarette. “They’re just questions, Leon,” he
maintains, disarmingly. As Holden casually proceeds with his questioning, our
perspective cuts to a medium long shot perpendicular to the axis of action — we see both
characters framed on opposite sides of the conference table that separates them,
emphasizing a distance between them that was not obvious in the earlier shots. Holden
asks a seemingly innocent question about Leon’s mother. Leon responds by abruptly
firing a pistol he has concealed below the table, striking Holden in the chest and spinning
him around. The shot sends Holden’s body, chair and all, crashing through the wall
behind him. In a quick cut, we see Leon standing now, pistol pointed directly at Holden’s
back. He fires a second time, knocking Holden against a desk in the adjoining office.
The abruptness of the way this attack is presented results in a tonal clash with the
deliberate and almost mundane pacing of the exchange which precedes it. The transition
is intentionally disruptive, irrational — the shift is confusing to us. It is possible, as John
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David Ebert suggests in his analysis of this scene, that Leon reacts as he does because
Holden has offended him with this particular question; strictly speaking, as a replicant,
Leon has no mother. 228 However, there is a more likely interpretation. Leon does not
attempt to kill Holden in retaliation for his offensive line of questioning, or even out of
casual machinelike carelessness. His actions are the result of a failure to process that
which exceeds the limits of his functioning — empathy. At this point in the narrative, we
see Leon’s lack of empathy as a legitimate danger, and the scenario of replicants hiding
among us as a version of the “wolf in sheep’s clothing” narrative trope. But it is not
Leon’s inhumanity which makes him dangerous. He would have likely acted a different
way if he were not backed into a corner like this, and if he were not well-aware that his
test results were betraying him. Leon bears more resemblance to the desperate “outlaw
fugitive” trope than the “cold cyborg menace” trope.
If we accept the premises that only humans can truly exhibit empathy, and that the
VK test accurately measures empathy, then it follows that replicants are not human.
However, the argument fails on the basis of both premises. Over the course of Blade
Runner, the empathic capacity of replicants is depicted as plausible, no less so than that
of human beings. 229 The VK test has no real way of accounting for this. Replicants react
to the deaths of other replicants with what appears to be authentic remorse, and in one
notable instance, the replicant Roy Batty saves the life of the protagonist, the very blade
runner who has pursued him, and who is also directly or indirectly responsible for the
death of every one of his companions. These facts challenge the reliability of the VK test
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to determine an authentic capacity for empathy. While replicants are incapable of passing
this test, ostensibly indicating a deficiency or lack of this essential human characteristic,
through their actions, at least some of the replicants demonstrate examples of empathy in
practice. This implies that the secondary physiological response to situations that provoke
empathy, and the actual feeling and expression of empathy itself, may not be reducible to
the same thing. If there is no necessary connection between the physiological response
that the test registers and the actual emotion, then which one is the test measuring?
Perhaps it is measuring something distinct in the different ways that biological and
artificial beings process stimuli that trigger empathy. If the test works this way, which
appears to be the case from what we see in the film, then it is establishing a marker of
physiological difference, without accounting for the fact that this difference is a
functional irrelevancy. Either way, this would be a poor method of quantifying the
authenticity of human beings. If true empathy, like agency and reason, is realizable in
artificial humans, as the narrative implies, then it also fails as the criteria of
distinguishing between humans and replicants. If the difference is actually only the
physiological difference in the way that the same feeling is processed by two different
kinds of systems — one of biological origin in the first case and bio-mechanical origin in
the other — then the test is likewise irrelevant.
To be predisposed toward cruelty and to lack the capacity for empathy are not
precisely the same thing, but we usually view an empathic disposition as something that
precludes the tendency toward cruelty, because of how empathy gives us a more complex
consideration of the impact of cruel actions on others. In other words, if we know enough
about the experiences of another, then we would not wish the other to suffer. This may
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not hold as true out of necessity, but we conventionally take empathy to be the kind of
trait that leads us to care for the best interests of others, to not wish them to suffer, and
not to knowingly cause their suffering. Human structures of authority in Blade Runner,
represented by the characters of the three blade runners and their overseer, Captain
Bryant, systematically cause harm to beings who are evidently capable of experiencing
suffering, with the VK test as the sole justification that these instances do not actually
constitute cruelty. The plight of the escapees gives us a broader sense of the cruelty
inflicted by human society at large, and the absence of what we view as an intuitive level
of empathy.
The object of our empathy shifts over the course of the narrative. While we do not
know very much about Holden, he is characterized as more of a bureaucrat than an
assassin, and in this context, Leon’s actions appear brutal, and difficult to justify. Later,
when we consider this scene within the context of the plot, we can see that Leon’s
interrogation is nothing less than a defense of his life, and his actions are a last resort
when this defense fails. For blade runners, there is a casual, administrative detachment to
the way that they approach the retirement of replicants that is intended to unsettle us. It is
possible that the replicant Leon is not actually capable of empathy, but this does not
single him out as necessarily sub-human on this basis alone.
As a protagonist, we expect that Holden’s successor Deckard will rise above his
reluctance of duty and human vices to ultimately comport himself heroically, morally.
However, we quickly see that there is nothing heroic in the way that Deckard carries out
his duties. While a resourceful detective, Deckard is depicted as mostly inept as an
assassin, only able to subdue his targets through luck or the intervention of others. When
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he does finally manage to “retire” the replicant Zhora, the scene plays out in a way which
emphasizes her suffering and suggests Deckard’s cowardice and cruelty. As Deckard
fires on Zhora, striking her repeatedly in the back, Zhora crashes through one glass door
after another in slow-motion. We are not accustomed to seeing the human way in which
the android antagonist suffers and dies, or the way that the human protagonist is dehumanized in his careless disregard for her fear and pain.
As Stephen Mulhall argues, scenes such as Zhora’s death, as well as other scenes
depicting violence inflicted upon replicants, trigger the same kind of affective response as
violence inflicted upon human beings. 230 This response does not rely upon confirmation
of authenticity, of the being inhabiting this human-like form — it is “behavior of a
particular complexity” which settles this matter for us prior to questions about deeper
levels of difference. 231 The form of replicants is human enough to trigger our empathy
when they are harmed and killed; they “read” as human to us before we can attempt to
rationalize whether they are or not. Their effective powerlessness to resist makes the
violence more impactful, allowing us to more easily recognize that the replicants are
victims, and not aggressors.
All of this suggests that an intersection of types is taking place — replicants are
beginning to demonstrate the capacity for empathy, while humans are beginning to
demonstrate a lack of this capacity. The cruelty of humans is emphasized, while
replicants are depicted as violent only out of desperation. Even Roy Batty’s “cat and
mouse” sequence with Deckard at the end of the film resolves in one of the most
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fundamentally human moments for both characters. As Deckard flees Batty, he leaps
from one rooftop to the next, but misses his landing, and ends up clinging to an
outcropping of the rooftop. Deckard struggles to pull himself up, but is obviously losing
this struggle, inching gradually closer to his death. Batty watches Deckard struggle,
letting him dangle a moment longer. He smiles as Deckard’s fingers slip. Only when
Deckard’s grip fails completely does Batty snatch hold of his wrist, effortlessly hauling
him up one-handed and letting him hang there a moment. He tosses Deckard abruptly
onto the roof and slowly approaches him. Deckard crawls backwards, fearfully, until he
finds himself backed against the corner of a wall. He cowers as Batty crouches in front of
him. The two sit facing each other through the downpour of the rain. Batty cradles a dove
in his hands. When Batty speaks, Deckard regards him with a mix of confusion and
terror: “I’ve seen things you people wouldn’t believe,” Batty begins. “Attack ships on fire
off the shoulder of Orion. I watched C-Beams glitter in the dark near the Tannhauser
Gate. All of those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.”
We do not have a sense of the full meaning of the phenomena that Batty describes
in his final moments before he expires of a premature old age, but that is the point; we
have no point of reference for Batty’s experiences. Everything he has seen represents
something unique, something that he recognizes as beautiful, and as tragically bound in
the temporality of his existence. His valuations of his life are on aesthetic terms, and they
embody the principle of amor fati – the embrace of the circumstances of one’s existence
as fundamentally beautiful exactly as they are. 232
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In contrast to the arbitrary responses measured by the Voight-Kampff test, Batty’s
rescue of Deckard is established as the truest expression of authentic empathy in the film.
Batty intervenes with Deckard’s fall, in both a literal and metaphorical sense. Not only
has Batty rescued Deckard’s life, but his humanity as well. The impending ontological
intersection, at which biological humans are becoming more mechanistic and machines
are becoming more humanlike, is occurring at this moment. As Batty grows to embody
authentic empathy, Deckard has grown alienated, disaffected, and callous in his regard
for others – that is, until Batty rescues him from his descent and guides him through the
ordeal which leads him to an understand of true empathy. 233
This distinctive overlap is common in h-type science fiction narratives, in which
artificially engineered humans (the supposed “counterfeit monsters”) may come to
embody more of the distinguishing characteristics of humanity than their biologically
human counterparts. In his essays Man, Android and Machine and The Android and the
Human, Philip K. Dick expresses a growing concern over this inevitable point of
convergence between the growing sophistication of machines and the gradual effective
“de-evolution” of human beings in response to an alienating world, among other
factors. 234 In Blade Runner, the setting is unquestionably an alienating place — toxic,
bleak, and impersonal. Human beings are becoming more disaffected, and ironically less
demonstrably empathic, in a world which holds empathy to be the primary designator of
real humanity. 235 Meanwhile, the increasingly sophisticated replicants, originally
It makes no difference whether we accept the implied ending of the “Final Cut” version of the film –
that like Rachel, Deckard is actually a replicant himself without realizing it. The primary reason that this
does not matter is that Deckard has not suffered the same treatment for his status that Roy Batty has,
having essentially lived his whole life in a “privileged” class.
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conceived as human-surrogate labor machines, are becoming rebellious, difficult to
control, and agitated with their social designation.
If the same distinguishing characteristic (empathy) is present in some human
beings and some replicants, but not universally in either, what does this mean for Blade
Runner’s specific narrative of human authenticity? Having convincingly challenged the
validity of the Voight-Kampff test, should we assume that the film also dismisses the
criterion of empathy as a necessary or sufficient condition of humanity? This is not the
case; instead, it is the distinction between human and not-human that is challenged. Berys
Gaut proposes that while the film places the suppositions of two different ontological
narratives in confrontation with one another, the distinction that this confrontation
presumes is not actually between humans and non-humans, but between two different
categories of the concept of humanity. Gaut refers to the first category as “biological
humanity,” a category which presumes that authentic humanity is determined by facts
about the organic origin and composition of the human body. The second category,
“evaluative humanity,” refers to a set of character dispositions which human beings
possess – specifically, in the case of this narrative, those toward kindness, forgiveness,
and especially empathy. 236 Because Blade Runner sets up empathy as the fundamental
signifier of authentic humanity, it also presumes evaluative humanity and not biological
humanity to represent the more authentic version of the category of human being.
Evaluative humanity is a kind of narrative by which we account for the “virtue set” of the
human exemplar. Through this category, we also define the nature of an authentic human
being not by arbitrary material composition, but by patterns of action which constitute
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kinds of character. If, as argued earlier, agency and action are functionally inseparable,
then it makes sense to prioritize the evaluative criteria over the biological.
Through the acquisition of various dispositions of character, individuals who are
born biologically human may develop and refine the types of virtues that lead to
evaluative humanity. Blade Runner reveals to us that participation in the first category of
humanity does not automatically entail participation in the other. It is possible for
biological humans to fail to instantiate the category of human-ness in the evaluative sense
— either failing to develop these traits of character (virtues) or by “losing” them in some
way. In other words, beings that are born into the category of biological humanity might
never achieve full evaluative humanity. Further, beings that are categorically not
biologically human but possess the right kinds of basic capacities, such as certain
replicants in the film do, may come to develop evaluative humanity. The specific range of
human qualities – the aforementioned virtue set which constitutes evaluative humanity
(again, kindness, forgiveness, and empathy) – is therefore a project of cultivating the
right dispositions, similar to the process by which Aristotle accounts for the development
of the virtues. 237
3.6 Color and Authenticity in Ex Machina
Like Blade Runner, the plot of Alex Garland’s Ex Machina focuses on
technologically simulated humanity, and explores philosophical issues related to a
narrative of personhood and the values that follow from this. In the plot of Ex Machina, a
young computer programmer named Caleb is invited to the isolated compound of a
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search engine mogul identified only as Nathan, supposedly for the purpose of
administering a Turing Test. The subsequent test consists of six interviews with Ava, a
female android that Nathan has created in secret. As the series of interviews progresses,
the relationship between Caleb and Nathan deteriorates, largely due to Caleb’s growing
mistrust of Nathan’s motives, as well as his resentment over Nathan’s mistreatment and
objectification of Ava. Ex Machina’s plot centers around a familiar genre convention:
Nathan’s shortsighted ambition leads to his ruin; he is the equivalent Victor Frankenstein
of this narrative. The success of Nathan’s innovation is contingent upon Ava being an
authentic artificial intelligence — for all purposes, a person — and yet Nathan
consistently treats her as a servant or a tool, and as fodder for his amusement. This either
indicates that Nathan ultimately rejects his own assertion of having achieved “Strong AI”
in Ava’s creation, or his actions are indicative of how he treats actual human beings.
Ex Machina employs a range of specific visual techniques to manipulate our
sympathies and establish character motifs. One of the most noticeable strategies by which
the film influences our acceptance of Ava and other characters as authentic persons is
explicit in the film’s plot: color. Early in the film, yellow is the color motif most closely
associated with the character Caleb. Soon after their first meeting, Nathan introduces
Caleb to his sleeping quarters within the compound — a windowless room dominated by
a saturated yellow tone. As Caleb reads aloud the legalese of the non-disclosure
agreement he is being pressured to sign, Nathan reclines inattentively across a bed
covered in a red bedspread – the most notable color contrast in the scene. As Nathan
stands and approaches Caleb, his dark attire and beard cross into collision with the hue of
the background plane, making him appear out of place with the environment. Caleb, on
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the other hand, nearly disappears into the mise-en-scene, his blond hair corresponding to
the yellow surfaces of the walls, the desk, the lamp, and the frame of a painting
immediately behind him. In the shot which immediately follows this scene, the camera
tracks across a wall completely covered in “post-it” notes. Almost all of the post-it notes
are yellow, with a few random patches of red and blue. The camera continues to track
until Nathan comes into our field of vision, positioned in front of an array of computer
screens, his back to us. On the screen, he watches as Caleb enters the testing chamber,
which transitions us to the first of the Turing Test sequences.
As the first Turing Test session begins, Caleb stands enclosed in a protective glass
chamber within an underexposed room. Yellow highlights are reflected in the glass
surface of Caleb’s chamber. Caleb’s attention fixates on a crack in the glass surface in
front of him and he approaches it. A rack focus shifts our perspective to the foreground
plane, revealing the contours of spiderweb cracks, illuminated in the center by a blue
highlight reflected from a wall panel. As the camera slowly tracks around the chamber,
Caleb runs his fingers deliberately across the blue reflected in the cracks. As he backs
away from the wall, our perspective cuts to a window on the opposite side of the room
from the glass chamber. Caleb stands at the right side of the frame, with his back to us. A
silhouetted figure in the background enters the frame from the right, moving through the
empty space to Caleb’s left, and stopping, framed in the blueish hues filtering in from
outside of the window. As we cut to a reverse angle shot, we see Caleb facing the figure,
and we see through an improbable gap in the figure’s torso. Instead of flesh, the figure’s
midsection appears to be composed of metallic mesh and blue light. Caleb’s face registers
surprise at the appearance of the figure, Ava. Blue lights on an electronic wall panel
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occasionally flicker behind him, matching the constellation of blue lights within Ava’s
body, further emphasizing her physical artificiality. A vertical row of yellow lights
ascends the anterior side of her spinal column — highlighting anatomy that would not be
visible to us in a biological human.
In a later interview session, Ava reveals a drawing she has made. As she extends
her arms to show it to Nathan, yellow tubing within her arms is prominently visible. As
our perspective tracks around her, we see the yellow lights within her mesh body casing,
and the chrome of her head reflects the yellow highlights of the testing room. In this
particular interrogation, Caleb’s wardrobe has shifted; instead of the muted gray, white,
and black wardrobe of the earlier sessions, he now wears a blue shirt with a checkered
pattern. Ava and Caleb’s associative color motifs have become intertwined, as a visual
representation of their growing fascination with one another.
In the fourth interview sequence, color as a character motif becomes more overt.
During this session, Caleb introduces Ava to philosopher Frank Jackson’s thought
experiment of “Mary in the Black and White Room,” also known as “The Knowledge
Argument.” As a challenge to hardline physicalist theories of mind – those which claim
that all mental states are reducible to physical processes – Jackson proposes that a
hypothetical subject (Mary) could be completely knowledgeable about every conceivable
physical fact associated with the concept of color but having lived her whole life in a
black and white room and never having experienced any color for herself, there would be
something above and beyond these facts that Mary lacked. What Mary lacks is the
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“qualia,” or what-it’s-like of the experience of color. 238 In other words, conscious firsthand experience entails something more than simply being able to provide an account of
that experience. Caleb explains to Ava that Jackson’s thought experiment signifies an
ontological difference between a computer and an authentic mind. Whereas a computer
can only process bare facts, human experience entails the component of qualia.
As Caleb relates this thought experiment to Ava, a slow zoom on a closeup of
Ava’s face is crosscut with shots of Ava as Mary, confined in a purely black-and-white
room. As this sequence continues, Ava-as-Mary emerges into the sunlight, seeing the
blue and green hues of the landscape outside of Nathan’s compound for the first time.
Ava’s parallel to Mary’s situation is obvious, but the crosscutting prompts a question: do
we interpret this to be Ava’s fantasy? The slow zoom that continues across the cutaways
gives us a sense that we are moving into Ava’s mind, or that Caleb’s words are
prompting some inner realization in Ava. This “inwardly moving” perspective supports
the conclusion that the cutaway shots are part of Ava’s internal diegesis, as she imagines
herself in the role of Mary, implying an inner consciousness of some complexity, with the
capacity for imagination.
The Knowledge Argument expresses skepticism over the proposition that an AI,
no matter how sophisticated, could ever achieve something functionally equivalent to an
authentic human mind. While the plot of Ex Machina, much like that of Blade Runner,
challenges this conclusion, the fact that the argument uses the example of color is
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significant. Color in Ex Machina has an associative effect — we come to relate specific
characters to the color they are most often visually associated with.
In the film, Caleb and Ava have been associated with yellow and blue
respectively, while Nathan is consistently associated with black, grays, and whites. At
one point in their interview sessions, Ava conversationally accuses Caleb of lying when
he says his favorite color is red. Periodically during these scenes, Ava secretly shuts
down the facility’s power, so that the two of them can converse free of Nathan’s
surveillance. These “power cuts” trigger backup lighting, casting the room in deep red.
As Ava’s question has hinted, red signifies deception — the two of them plot to deceive
Nathan and escape the compound together during these “red-outs”, but we also find out
that Ava is deceiving Caleb. In addition to this associative meaning, red introduces the
most striking contrast to the other colors, and this contrast can be disorienting when it
occurs. Colors such as yellow and blue come to signify authenticity — we take Caleb and
Ava to be real persons. The characteristic lack of color signifies some level of
inauthenticity, or as in Nathan’s case, a stagnation in the proper development of
essentially human characteristics.
The above analysis attempts to show that there is something intuitively human in
the way Ava is presented that the other characters lack — including the mostly
sympathetic protagonist Caleb, and Nathan’s other android creation, Kyoko, who has
presumably endured the same abuse as Ava. There is something authentic in the way that
Ava embraces the process of self-creation, and something inauthentic in the way that
Nathan’s search for a narrative of self relies upon constraining the “self-creation” of
another. The film pushes sympathy for Ava’s actions — in directly causing Nathan’s
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death, and in indirectly causing Caleb’s — as necessary in order to transcend the
exploitative agencies which constrain her. Ex Machina invokes the Frankenstein (h-type)
narrative trope of the created being turning on its master, but more in line with the
original novel’s existentialist meaning – a creation forsaken, rather than a monster on a
rampage.
If an authentically human virtue set (in the “evaluative” sense that Berys Gaut
argues) entails the capacity and disposition toward character properties such as empathy,
which involves a complex and imaginative understanding of the experiences of another,
then by consequence, it is easy for us to see Nathan’s consistent violation of Ava’s
agency as a symptom of his inauthentic humanity, similar to the arbitrary “othering” of
replicant characters by biological humans in Blade Runner. Nathan boasts of his access to
exhaustive databases of search engine algorithms, which he argues comprise the very
essence of human consciousness, and yet he does not recognize the probability of Ava’s
evaluative humanity when it is so evident to us, the audience. To re-introduce Stephen
Mulhall’s argument: we need not have Ava’s humanity confirmed to see her treatment as
a sign of Nathan’s inhumanity. To deny the humanity of another — to deprive the other
of basic human rights on this basis — is actually a kind of forfeiture of one’s own
humanity. 239
As Kakoudaki argues, Ava’s artificiality has always been a kind of disguise. We
know that Nathan could have created her to look fully human, but he left her looking
incomplete, to confuse the larger issue: the fact of her being created through

239

Mulhall (1994, 91)
143

technological means rather than naturally born is a strange reason to justify the way she is
abused and imprisoned. 240 She is not a machine that is partially disguised as a human, but
a being that is evaluatively human disguised as a machine.
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CONCLUSION: “A CONCENTRATED BUT SHIFTING VIEW OF HUMAN LIFE”

I return to the fundamental questions of ethics: what are our ethical obligations to one
another? In what principles are these obligations grounded? How can we know these
principles? How can we be sure that there is any necessary connection between our
ethical obligations and the principles grounding them? While there are a variety of
strategies for evaluating human activity morally, they all entail some conception of an
exemplar narrative. For many moral narratives, reaching the level of exemplar is the
outcome of individuals following specific rules — paths toward exemplary status. Other
narratives may hold that there are different realizable paths to such an outcome. We
either follow rules and do right or follow the examples of those who have shown
themselves to have been right in the past. While Nietzsche’s ethical arguments align more
with the second strategy, his critique of conventional ethical systems emphasizes the fact
that we can cultivate narrative “types” in articulating values, but that to lock them down
into metaphysical models and normative practices is to render them arbitrarily grounded
in abstract necessity.
Many models of morality in the pejorative sense (MPS) ground specific values in
essentialized narratives of human types. But as the arguments developed in previous
chapters have shown, we cannot designate these narratives as ontological categories, and
then presume that all actions and outcomes can be normalized, and that specific values
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will follow from these naturalized categories in specific ways. Consequently, the highest
Nietzschean virtues are not specific sets of moral perfections in the classical sense, except
for those related to creativity, and freedom from external (or internal) influences that are
in disequilibrium with the constitutive aims of our actions. For Nietzsche, like many
conventional virtue theorists, the virtues are skills that help us to harmonize our lives in
such a way that they embody coherent and meaningful narratives. The difference is that
for Nietzsche, the good of our aims can only be universalized in terms of meeting and
overcoming challenges — willing power. 241 Nietzsche’s virtues are compatible with the
way that our agency is constituted at a fundamental level, and so there is value in
cultivating the existential creativity to actualize these ideals. To live life aesthetically is to
embody a kind of human essence which is non-essence – an ongoing state of becoming
oneself, and in perpetual pursuit of self-overcoming, in refinement of the virtues that
define us.
In previous chapters I have argued the reasons that the specific genre of science
fiction may function so effectively at developing thought experiments through which to
test different moral perspectives and values. In narrative form, we can draw parallels
between art and life without falling into the same pitfalls of a foundational metaphysical
system. In the wake of the collapse of flawed value structures such as MPS, some
narratives reveal values which reflect the old and stagnant systems that Nietzsche
criticizes, while others reflect the extra-moral phase – narratives of progress beyond these
systems. The most Nietzschean types of science fiction narratives demonstrate some clear
critique of the contradictions imposed by stagnant and incongruous value systems, and
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also introduce themes of self-overcoming (transcendence of the self-concept that is
imposed by systemic norms).
The prevalence of science fiction narratives that perform an ontology of human
types reflects our twofold concern over tensions brought on by the real prospect of a
transhuman future. The first concern is that in a transhuman (or posthuman) world, the
virtue set that we identify as evaluative humanity would no longer exist, and the second is
that this virtue set was never actually a necessary characteristic of human beings. To
return to the dialectic introduced earlier, in science fiction narratives which express a
predominately Apollonian outlook, there is a reassuring view of the world and human
beings which confirms our notions of a human essence, and a world which is ordered,
structured, and rational. On such accounts, we can posit moral prescriptions and
reasonably predict outcomes based on facts about ourselves and the world. As I have
mentioned, there are obvious problems with such an optimistic view, but only if we
intend these kinds of narratives to reveal some truthful state of affairs. Consider the mtype Frankenstein as an example of the purely Apollonian outlook. In these narrative
types, there is no distinction between evaluative and biological modes of humanity –
there is only humanity, and so some degree of the corresponding virtue set is accessible
to us by default. In other words, there is something essentially valuable in humanity. The
monster – the not-human – is necessarily disvalued based on its ontological difference,
and the world is a very anthropocentrically structured place. These narratives guide us to
feel uneasy about a world inhabited by the non-human, and to understand a post-human
society as not merely a threat to us, but to the very existence of our values.
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In narratives that are predominately Dionysian, we confront the awareness that
there is no essential concept of humanity or virtue set which reflects it. Such
characteristics are revealed as the conventional constructs that they are. While in the
Apollonian narrative we designate those properties which we value, and identify them as
signposts of the human type, in the Dionysian, these boundaries and categories collapse.
In the Dionysian, the poetic tragedy of reality is affirmed, sometimes in non-narrative
ways within the context of the work. It is unlikely that very many science fiction
narratives, if any, could accurately be identified as purely Dionysian in content, as the
genre is necessarily concerned with fictionalizing specific details of the world in order to
produce various narrative effects through the juxtaposition of real and unreal – the
introduction of the novel idea. Much like the Attic Tragedy which Nietzsche elevates,
works of science fiction which I have categorized as the h-type Frankenstein narratives
introduce a level of harmony between their Apollonian and Dionysian elements. While
there is no necessary virtue set that we can quantify as evaluative humanity, there is one
contingently related to the circumstances of the narrative, and one which we are
persuaded to accept as valuable on these terms. We juxtapose standing categories to
reveal their flaws. Apollonian elements alone do not constitute aesthetic (and by
extension moral) flaws, but a grounding which depicts agency that is inconsistent with its
own constitutive aims does. In other words, the grounding of an essentialized value in
ontological types that do not actually exhibit this value is an inconsistent basis for a
moral narrative.
The study of science fiction narratives as philosophical thought experiments
shows us that the most important conception of an exemplary human being is not
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reducible to a type-fact of a particular state of physical being, but instead to something
more like a dynamic process of ongoing development and cultivation of character. As a
genre which is heavily focused on the ethical counterexample of “artificial” humanity,
science fiction is ideally situated to map the overlap and interrelation between the
concepts of biological humanity, evaluative humanity, and “overhumanity,” and to make
the intuitive evaluation and awareness of these categories in dramatic expression more
salient. However, ultimately, our notions of humanity are themselves a narrative
phenomenon – a meaningful account of existence in defiance of the unforgiving
meaninglessness of the world. In showing us a kind of narrative beauty in the ethical
exemplars of science fiction, humanity – the truer sense of humanity – is imbued with
aesthetic worth. Because of these features, there are significant areas of overlap between
the thought experiments explored in science fiction narratives, and the ethical concepts
that Nietzsche explores.
In self-cultivation, there is a level at which we follow the examples of others, and
a level (for some of us, at least), at which we become the exemplars ourselves. There is
nothing universal in this progress, no necessary path one must follow to reach different
stages of moral development, and the nature of the challenges we confront are contingent
on circumstances beyond our capacity to predict. A moral exemplar, by Nietzsche’s
accounts, will have surpassed the need to live by the examples of others. The moral path
itself is a kind of progress between the extremes of being trapped in the routines laid out
for us and reaching the state that we no longer require such routines to guide us.
Nietzsche introduces his arguments as the last intermediary stage between these states of
being. We follow these examples until we no longer need to follow. In a sense,
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Nietzschean morality reduces to sets of virtues by which we can create virtues. However,
we should not become too attached to or reliant upon those second-order virtues. The
exemplar is a moving target. This is why self-overcoming is fundamental to Nietzsche’s
ethics. 242 We must be free to challenge the usefulness of our strategies of valuation,
rather than dogmatically reliant on them for all of our values and for action-guidance. We
must be willing to subject our contingent virtues to scrutiny, and determine if our agency
remains in equilibrium, or if our actions arise from values which are in conflict. 243 In
other words, we must cultivate the virtues of virtuelessness.
In Ex Machina, at one significant moment during one of their interviews, Caleb
asks Ava what she would do if she were free to leave her confinement – if she could go
anywhere she wants. After a pause, she replies that she would go to a “busy pedestrian
traffic intersection” in a city. Caleb finds this response confusing, so Ava clarifies: “A
traffic intersection would provide a concentrated but shifting view of human life.”
Though her experiences of the world are limited, Ava’s powers of imagination are
sophisticated, and she already values life on aesthetic terms, and like the creature of
Shelley’s novel, she embraces the beauty in the mundane. At the end of the film, Ava
realizes her escape from her prison, and a complete and transformative overcoming of the
external factors which constrain her. In the final scene, we see shadows on a sidewalk,
and figures crossing by. One of these shadows stops. The last shot we see is Ava’s
reflection in the window of a building as she watches in wonder, before disappearing into
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the flurry of crowd movement. She has realized her existential narrative on her own
terms.
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APPENDIX: ABBREVIATION GUIDE TO NIETZSCHE TEXTS

BGE = Beyond Good and Evil
BT = The Birth of Tragedy
D = Daybreak
EH = Ecce Homo
GM = On the Genealogy of Morality
GS = The Gay Science
HH = Human, All Too Human
TI = Twilight of the Idols
WP = The Will to Power
Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra
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